The informational profile of valence: The metasemantic argument for imperativism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Some mental states have valence—they are pleasant or unpleasant. According to imperativism, valence depends on imperative content, while evaluativism tells us that it depends on evaluative content. We argue that if one considers valence’s informational profile, it becomes evident that imperativism is superior to evaluativism. More precisely, we show that if one applies the best available metasemantics to the role played by (un)pleasant mental states in our cognitive economy, then these states turn out to have imperative rather than evaluative content, since: (i) they are much more informative about behaviour than they are about the world; and (ii) they occupy a stage in the information-processing chain that is closer to behaviour production than it is to the uptake of sensory information. This is our metasemantic argument for imperativism.

Similar books and articles

Valence: A reflection.Luca Barlassina - 2021 - Emotion Researcher: ISRE's Sourcebook for Research on Emotion and Affect (C. Todd and E. Wall Eds.).
Relational Imperativism about Affective Valence.Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:341-371.
Imperative Transparency.Manolo Martínez - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):585-601.
Pains as reasons.Manolo Martínez - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274.
Cartesian Imperativism.Joseph Gottlieb & Saja Parvizian - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):702-725.
Pains, Imperatives, and Intentionalism.Maura Tumulty - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (3):161-166.
Pain Experiences and Their Link to Action: Challenging Imperative Theories.Sabrina Coninx - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):104-126.
Zur Phänomenologie der Aufforderungscharaktere.Andrea Borsato - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (2):243-267.
Immoralism and the Valence Constraint.James Harold - 2008 - British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (1):45-64.
Fifty Shades of Affective Colouring of Perception.Frederique de Vignemont - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):1-15.
Valence and Value.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):658-680.


Added to PP

165 (#91,446)

6 months
165 (#6,746)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Manolo Martínez
Universitat de Barcelona
Luca Barlassina
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations