Abstract

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis maintains that a precise understanding of the nature of the concept of 'person' as opposed to the concepts of 'self' and 'human being', will dissolve some of the problems and paradoxes which are frequently encountered in theories concerning the concept of person and personal identity. The accounts offered by different philosophers vary in their assumptions regarding what a person is, thus problems arise as a result of both the lack of clarity concerning the nature of 'person' and the lack of consistency between writers in their use of the term. ;In support of the above contention, a selection of theories concerning the concept of 'person' and personal identity is presented and criticised. The author has selected the theories of P. F. Strawson, D. C. Dennett, D. Parfitt and J. Perry, amongst others, as representative of different types of theories to be found in this field. ;It is further argued that may of the confusions which arise in consideration of personal identity result from a misinterpretation of J. Locke's account of personal identity. This work therefore presents an exposition of Locke's account which isolates possible sources of misunderstanding. It is held that the objections levelled by J. Butler and T. Reid against certain interpretations of Locke's theory can be sustained against modern theories which fail to distinguish between the concept of 'person' and personal identity, and the concept of 'self' and the continuity of consciousness. ;The author proposes an alternative analysis which differentiates between the concepts of 'self', 'person', and 'human being', whilst maintaining that there exists only one ontological entity--the individual--which is the subject of conception under different modes of thought