Probabilistic equilibria for evolutionarily stable strategies

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):34-36 (2007)
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Abstract

This commentary suggests that an equilibrium framework may be retained, in an evolutionary model such as Gintis's and with more satisfactory results, if rationality is relaxed in a slightly different way than he proposes: that is, if decisions are assumed to be related to rewards probabilistically, rather than with certainty. This relaxed concept of rationality gives rise to probabilistic equilibria. (Published Online April 27 2007).

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