Virtue epistemology, testimony, and trust

Logos and Episteme 5 (1):95-102 (2014)

Authors
Benjamin McCraw
University Of South Carolina Upstate
Abstract
In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtue epistemologist must either deny that S knows that p only if S believes that p because of S’s virtuous operation or deny that intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the apparent ease by which we obtain testimonial knowledge and, thus, how the virtue epistemologist can explain such knowledge in a way that both preserves testimonial knowledge and grounds it in one’s virtues. I argue that the virtue epistemologist has a way to accomplish both tasks if we take epistemic trust to be an intellectual virtue. I briefly discuss what such trust must look like and then apply it to the dilemma at hand: showing that a key intellectual virtue plausibly operates in cases of testimonial knowledge and/or belief
Keywords Trust  Testimony  Confidence  Dependence  Virtue Epistemology
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20145124
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