Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory

Erkenntnis 66 (3):393-407 (2007)
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Abstract

This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.

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10.1007/s10670-007-9040-7

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Phyllis Illari
University College London

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References found in this work

How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
Agency and probabilistic causality.Huw Price - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):157-176.
Against causal decision theory.Huw Price - 1986 - Synthese 67 (2):195 - 212.

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