Principle of Sufficient Reason

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ()
Authors
Yitzhak Melamed
Johns Hopkins University
Martin Lin
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a powerful and controversial philosophical principle stipulating that everything must have a reason or cause. This simple demand for thoroughgoing intelligibility yields some of the boldest and most challenging theses in the history of metaphysics and epistemology. In this entry we begin with explaining the Principle, and then turn to the history of the debates around it. A section on recent discussions of the Principle will be added in the near future.
Keywords Princeple of Sufficient Reason  Leibniz  Spinoza  Indentity of Indiscernibles  Kant  Maimon
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On the Origins and Foundations of Laplacian Determinism.Marij van Strien - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:24-31.
On the Philosophy of Cosmology.George Francis Rayner Ellis - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (1):5-23.

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