De Essentia Individua: In Defence Of Possible Worlds Existentialism

Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1):99-114 (1984)
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Abstract

The actualist position rests on the mistaken assumption that individuals can be referred to before they exist; the existentialist makes no such assumption. Plantinga's criticisms of existentialism founder on his claim that for a proposition the only possibility is possible truth. In fact, there is another kind of possibility, viz. possible predication. Hence, 'Socrates does not exist' is a possible predication, even though not possibly true. Plantinga's other putative counter examples are flawed in the same way

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