Peirce, Levi, and the aims of inquiry

Philosophy of Science 54 (2):256-265 (1987)
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Abstract

Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own "epistemological infallibilism". I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry

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2009-01-28

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Cheryl Misak
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
The Epistemology of Scientific Evidence.Douglas Walton & Nanning Zhang - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 21 (2):173-219.
Reasoning About Knowledge Using Defeasible Logic.Douglas Walton - 2011 - Argument and Computation 2 (2-3):131 - 155.
Statistical Method and the Peircean Account of Truth.Andrew Reynolds - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):287-314.

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References found in this work

Peirce.Timothy H. Engstrom & Christopher Hookway - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (155):248.
Fallibilism and Necessity.Susan Haack - 1979 - Synthese 41 (1):37 - 63.
Messianic Vs Myopic Realism.Isaac Levi - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:617-636.

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