The Brave Officer Rides Again

Erkenntnis 83 (2):315-329 (2018)

Authors
Andreas Mogensen
Oxford University
Abstract
According to the Psychological Account of personal identity, personal identity across time is maintained by some form of psychological overlap or continuance. I show that the Psychological Account has trouble accommodating cases of transient retrograde amnesia. In such cases, the transitivity of psychological continuity may break down. I consider various means of responding to this problem, arguing that the best available response will undercut our ability to rely on intuitions about brain transplantation to support the Psychological Account. When the Psychological Account is re-interpreted in such a way as to overcome the problems posed by cases of transient retrograde amnesia, it turns out that standard brain transplantation cases involve details which are strictly irrelevant according to the theory. On the other hand, these features seem to drive our intuitions about survival in these cases. In this way, my argument undermines one of the key motivations for adopting the Psychological Account.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-017-9891-5
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References found in this work BETA

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Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.

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