Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory [Book Review]

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Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):171-90 (1997)
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Abstract

The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.

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10.1023/a:1008270519000

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Citations of this work

Common Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoning.Richmond H. Thomason - 2021 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 50 (2):229-247.
Common knowledge revisited.Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi - 1999 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):89-105.
Common Knowledge and Argumentation Schemes .Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2005 - Studies in Communication Sciences 5 (2):1-22.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.
A completeness theorem in modal logic.Saul Kripke - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1):1-14.
The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory.Stephen Morris - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):227.

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