Bare particulars and individuation reply to Mertz

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1 – 13 (2003)
Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the three arguments Mertz raises against bare particulars. To substantiate this assertion, we clarify the nature of bare particulars as individuators, state Mertz's objections, and respond to them. We conclude that Mertz has failed to show that bare particular theory is untenable.
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DOI 10.1080/715690946
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Andrew M. Bailey (2012). No Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.

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