“Red-Green” or “Brown-Green” Dichromats? The Accuracy of Dichromat Basic Color Terms Metacognition Supports Denomination Change

Frontiers in Psychology 12 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Two experiments compared “Red-Green” dichromats’ empirical and metacognized capacities to discriminate basic color categories and to use the corresponding basic color terms. A first experiment used a 102-related-colors set for a pointing task to identify all the stimuli that could be named with each BCT by each R-G dichromat type. In a second experiment, a group of R-G dichromats estimated their difficulty discriminating BCCs-BCTs in a verbal task. The strong coincidences between the results derived from the pointing and the verbal tasks indicated that R-G dichromats have very accurate metacognition about their capacities and limitations in the use of BCTs. Multidimensional scaling solutions derived from both tasks were very similar: BCTs in R-G dichromats were properly represented in 2D MDS solutions that clearly show one chromatic dimension and one achromatic dimension. Important concordances were found between protanopes and deuteranopes. None of these dichromats showed substantial difficulty discriminating the Red-Green pair. So, to name them “R-G” dichromats is misleading considering their empirical capacities and their metacognition. Further reasons to propose the use of the alternative denomination “Brown-Green” dichromats are also discussed. We found some relevant differences between the “Brown-Green” dichromats’ empirical and self-reported difficulties using BCTs. Their metacognition can be considered a “caricature” of their practical difficulties. This caricature omits some difficulties including their problems differentiating “white” and “black” from other BCTs, while they overestimate their limitations in differentiating the most difficult pairs. Individual differences scaling analyses indicated that the metacognition regarding the use of BCTs in “Brown-Green” dichromats, especially deuteranopes, is driven slightly more by the chromatic dimension and driven slightly less by the achromatic dimension, than their practical use of BCTs. We discuss the relevance of our results in the framework of the debate between the linguistic relativity hypothesis and the universal evolution theories.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Olive green or chestnut brown?Rolf G. Kuehni - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):35-36.
Unique Hue Stimulus Choice: A Constraint on Hue Category Formation.Rolf Kuehni - 2005 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 (3-4):387-408.
Are Color Categories Innate or Internalized? Hypotheses and Implications.David Bimler - 2005 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 (3-4):265-292.
Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims about Phenomenal Structure.Juan Suarez & Martine Nida-rümelin - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346 - 391.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-03-04

Downloads
7 (#1,365,399)

6 months
5 (#633,186)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution.Brent Berlin & Paul Kay - 1991 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
An opponent-process theory of color vision.Leo M. Hurvich & Dorothea Jameson - 1957 - Psychological Review 64 (6, Pt.1):384-404.
Color Vision.Leo Maurice Hurvich - 1981 - Sinauer Associates.
Human Color Vision.Peter K. Kaiser & Robert M. Boynton - 1996 - Washington: Optical Society of America.

View all 8 references / Add more references