On the possibility of mind-reading or the external control of behavior: Contribution of Aquinas to the Neurorights discussion

Scientia et Fides 11 (2):87-105 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Thomas Aquinas holds that the actual content of our thought is not accessible for any creature, and that free will cannot be superseded. These theses are founded on the spiritual condition of our intelligence and will, which makes them directly invulnerable to any intervention on our body. On the other hand, he enthrones the will as the keeper of interiority: it precludes a full transparency that would make our free decision to communicate superfluous, and it exert an inalienable control over the action through which we direct ourselves to the good. In this sense, Aquinas departs from reductionist accounts, which either refuse the existence of free will, suppressing the reason to protect its expression, or face the difficulty of explaining the meaning and justification of the rights that are claimed for free will. However, Thomas Aquinas admits the possibility of indirectly accessing our minds through the knowledge of brain states and of influencing our will through passions by means of alterations of our organisms. Although this possibility was not within the reach of the human being in his time, he considered it was within the reach of separated substances. The consideration of the limits of their perspicacity and control sheds light on the possibilities that neurotechnology can allow in the future. The existence of an unassailable stronghold that guarantees our interiority and free will legitimates our right to be respected but does not make their protection superfluous.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,867

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Free Will.Tao Xu - 2001 - Philosophy and Culture 28 (8):753-760.
Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Free Will and the Knowledge Condition.Eddy Andre Nahmias - 2001 - Dissertation, Duke University

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-11-11

Downloads
26 (#597,650)

6 months
19 (#182,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

José Ignacio Murillo
University of Navarra

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references