Philosophy of Neuroscience

Among the most auspicious findings of neuroscience in recent years is the mutability of brain connectivity. In allowing for an increased integration of the study of brain with the study of mind, it deepens our understanding of affect and cognition and of the perceptual and imaginative dimensions of the psyche. It is the primary objective of this article to investigate what the young discipline known as neuroaesthetics brings to our understanding of Beckett’s creativity and how it enriches our scholarship. Focusing (...) on Beckett’s preoccupation with memory, resituating this preoccupation within the arena of the Default Mode Network — in which reference to self is spontaneous and in some sense deeply related to the freely associative speech of the “talking cure” — leads to several conclusions: The most significant include the potentially therapeutic value Beckett derived from writing (change in the mind being a function of change in the brain) and to the justification for recontextualizing psychohistory (speculative at best) as psychobiology. (shrink)

Varela's enactive approach to cognitive science has been elaborated into a theoretical framework of agency, sense-making, and sociality, while his key methodological innovation — neurophenomenology (NP) — continues to inspire empirical work. We argue that the enactive approach was originally expressed in NP as three core tenets: (1) phenomenological pragmatics, (2) embodied cognition, and (3) conscious efficacy. However, most efforts in NP have focused on applying tenet 1, while tenet 2 has received notably less attention, and there is even explicit (...) distancing from tenet 3. By way of a critical review of four case studies, we show how NP thereby falls short of its full potential. Crucially, it needs to demonstrate that the first-person perspective matters, not only as a source of correlations with third-person data, but because lived experience, as such, makes a difference in its own right to the living body's dynamics. Given that methods for improving subjective reports have become accepted in human neuroscience (tenet 1), and given the increasing availability for recording multi-scalar organismic activity during embodied action (tenet 2), we propose it is time to integrate these research strands by using this issue of conscious efficacy as a pivot point (tenet 3). The development of genuinely experience-involving accounts of neurophysiological activity during embodied action holds promise for rebooting neurophenomenology in stronger form. (shrink)

How do emotional and social experiences influence the knowledge we produce about our world? Here I investigate this question in two contexts: the individual mind, as represented in literature, and recent critical practices in the humanities. I combine readings of Toni Cade Bambara’s The Salt Eaters, Toni Morrison’s Sula and Beloved, and Leslie Marmon Silko’s Ceremony with contemporary neuroscience to explore the roles of gender and community in trauma and healing, with particular attention to the way emotion shapes perception, cognition, (...) and memory. I lay the theoretical groundwork for this study with a sustained analysis of recent shifts away from poststructuralist accounts of the subject, as they are taking shape across contemporary critical theory and current public and academic receptions of neuroscience. At its heart, my project forges new paths for interdisciplinary exchange in order to shed light on the more underattended features of human knowledge, while foregrounding issues of gender,agency, and relationality. In the first half of the dissertation, I analyze trauma studies in the 1990s, and interdisciplinary engagements with neuroscience in the past decade, two movements whose vogue has been as substantial as it is surprising. That an era generally held to be poststructuralist, antibiological, and postmodern – that is, that conceives identity as fluid, shifting, and socially constructed – should be so fascinated by accounts of the subject that involve, of all things, permanence, indelibility, or biology, is intriguing. In these chapters, I work to contextualize these fields historically, culturally, and theoretically, and to compare their symbolic investments, with particular attention to the role of affect in their intellectual reception. In the second half of the dissertation, I explore how accounts of the mind and the brain might be thought together, focusing on the role of gender and of community in traumatic memory and healing through the lens of the core novels in dialogue with contemporary neuroscience. In advancing innovative frameworks for combining science and the humanities, my goal is not only to deepen our understanding of knowledge production, but also to expand our repertoire of methods of pursuing knowledge. (shrink)

During the Covid-19 pandemic, Hovey was contacted by the lead of a pan-Canadian working group on pediatric brain tumours (PBTWG). While all stakeholders (researchers, clinicians, regulators, patient advocates, ethicists, and industry experts) were highly motivated to address barriers through innovative strategies in collaboration, clinical research, regulation, and business models, advancement has been challenging on multiple levels. Hovey and his team were tasked to facilitate and successfully engage this diverse divisive group of stakeholders to achieve their goals. Inspired by Richard Kearney’s (...) anatheistic wager, the hermeneutic wager acts simultaneously as a team building and research approach, as it serves to gain insight into the perspectives of members of a purposeful community. Through its five conversations, namely imagination, humility, commitment, discernment, and hospitality, the hermeneutic wager elicits responses from the participants that are based on meaningful participation in a relational approach of community co-creation. We individually interviewed the PBTWG facilitators (5). With informed consent, our research team also recorded all 5 of the PBTWG work group meetings (20 participants from 6 stakeholder groups) and break-out room meetings and took notes which consist of rich and extensive narrative data. This data was analyzed alongside the individual PBTWG interviews. The audio and visual data collected via a secure Zoom platform was then transcribed verbatim and analyzed interpretively according to the applied philosophical hermeneutic tradition. Findings centered around six points: “The Work of Stories,” “Changing Landscapes: Community / Communication not Consensus,” “Let the Words Lead You,” “Those Words Matter,” “Metaphors as a Bridge to Understanding,” and “A Road Map to be Inspired By.” Through these findings, we contend that the hermeneutic wager is an invitation for conversation that builds a path to the generation of new and creative understandings that transcend previous ways of knowing. The efficacy of the hermeneutic wager resides in its ability to help build a community of people who work together through and across difference to arrive at a shared understanding and collective outcome. (shrink)

Discussions on the concept of Ma’rifatullah (knowledge of God) have an important place in the science of kalam as the basis of belief. There are different opinions among the schools of theology regarding whether those who do not receive divine messages are obliged to know God. In this context, this study focuses on how the biological and psychological nature of human beings can affect their belief in God and their quest for knowledge. After human psychology, genetics, and epigenetic grounding, the (...) subject is discussed in detail with neurobiological arguments. Theologians consider it obligatory for human beings to use their intellect and think about God’s existence and unity. However, it has been emphasized that the human mind is not independent of its other senses, along with psychological, genetic, and neurobiological factors. Considering that human beings are affected by their environment through their biological and psychological structures, the difficulty of reaching ma’rifatullah (knowledge of God) through reason alone has been revealed. Attention has been paid to whether mind-based responsibility is in line with human nature. For this reason, it has been stated that environmental influences should be taken into consideration in the issue of reflection and reasoning, and it has been discussed whether theologians' views on the knowledge of God (are compatible with modern science and human nature. (shrink)

Neural decoding studies seem to show that the “private” experiences of others are more accessible than philosophers have traditionally believed. While these studies have many limitations, they do demonstrate that by capturing patterns in brain activity, we can discover a great deal about what a subject is experiencing. We present a thought experiment about a super-decoder — the Atlantis machine — and argue that given plausible assumptions, an Atlantis machine could one day be built. On the basis of this argument, (...) we then argue for the rejection of robust notions of consciousness, which have generated numerous puzzles, including puzzles about the possibility of philosophical zombies. In light of the Atlantis machine, it can be seen that robust notions of consciousness do not earn their explanatory or descriptive keep. More modest concepts of consciousness are sufficient to account for all phenomena — in both senses of the term. This kind of antirobustness about consciousness is a deflationary approach to conscious experience that differs in important ways from illusionist approaches. (shrink)

Nagappan, Kalokairinou, and Wexler (2021) raised a serious ethical question: Are off-label practices or direct-to-consumer medical devices offered to public exempted from clinical or research gover...

Ce texte n’est rien d’autre qu’une note de lecture en marge du livre du neuroscientifique Lionel Naccache, Le cinéma intérieur. Projection privée au cœur de la conscience (Odile Jacob, 2020). Tout en reconnaissant l’intérêt de cet ouvrage et plus généralement des recherches en neurosciences cognitives pour l’étude de la fiction, je mets en évidence le panfictionnalisme qui anime Naccache. Ce panfictionnalisme découle de l’absence d’une définition claire de la fiction et de la non-distinction qui en résulte entre fiction et récit.

Thomas Aquinas holds that the actual content of our thought is not accessible for any creature, and that free will cannot be superseded. These theses are founded on the spiritual condition of our intelligence and will, which makes them directly invulnerable to any intervention on our body. On the other hand, he enthrones the will as the keeper of interiority: it precludes a full transparency that would make our free decision to communicate superfluous, and it exert an inalienable control over (...) the action through which we direct ourselves to the good. In this sense, Aquinas departs from reductionist accounts, which either refuse the existence of free will, suppressing the reason to protect its expression, or face the difficulty of explaining the meaning and justification of the rights that are claimed for free will. However, Thomas Aquinas admits the possibility of indirectly accessing our minds through the knowledge of brain states and of influencing our will through passions by means of alterations of our organisms. Although this possibility was not within the reach of the human being in his time, he considered it was within the reach of separated substances. The consideration of the limits of their perspicacity and control sheds light on the possibilities that neurotechnology can allow in the future. The existence of an unassailable stronghold that guarantees our interiority and free will legitimates our right to be respected but does not make their protection superfluous. (shrink)

In this publication, we will use the principal concepts of John of the Cross, the famous mystic of the XVI th century, as a framework to go over, in a non-reductionist way, three challenges in contemporary neuroscience of decision-making. Firstly, the dark night and the purgative paths will be related to discontinuity in decision-making. Secondly, the passive and active paths will be associated to brain plasticity, architecture, and levels of decision. Thirdly, the illumination, which can be felt when a solution (...) is reached, has to do with positive emotions and can be inspired by the science of love of John of the Cross. We shall lastly conclude by emphasizing the usefulness of his work to illuminate the neuroscience of decision-making. (shrink)

International institutions such as UNESCO are deliberating on a new standard setting instrument for neurotechnologies. This will likely lead to the adoption of a soft law document which will be the first global document specifically tailored to neurotechnologies, setting the tone for further international or domestic regulations. While some stakeholders have been consulted, these developments have so far evaded the broader attention of the neuroscience, neurotech, and neuroethics communities. To initiate a broader debate, this target article puts to discussion twenty-five (...) considerations and desiderata for recognition by a future instrument. They are formulated at different levels of abstraction, from the big picture to technical details, seek to widen the perspective of preparatory reports and transcend the narrow debate about “neurorights” which overshadows many richer and more relevant aspects. These desiderata are not an exhaustive enumeration but a starting point for discussions about what deserves and what requires protection by an international instrument. (shrink)

ABSTRACT For a long time, the question of the existence of free will has fueled philosophical debate with no definitive solution. Libet’s paradigm (1983) seemed to demonstrate that simple and apparently voluntary movements could be triggered not by consciousness, but by preconscious or random brain processes. Such findings had wide repercussions in the academic and scientific circles, triggering an extensive discussion among neuroscientists, philosophers and jurists. Exploring the interfaces between neuroscience and free will, the present work aims to formulate an (...) updated synthesis of the diverse problematizations about the Libetian findings. It appears that Libet’s essay, although repeatedly analyzed and replicated in recent decades, still lacks a definitive interpretation, in part due to methodological controversies and specific conceptual shortcomings. The deepening of these investigations, combined with the new discoveries offered by neuroscience, can enrich research on free will in the coming years. (shrink)

The author of this paper discusses the theme of the "simulated body", that is the sense of "being there” in a body that is not one's own, or that does not exist in the way one perceives it. He addresses this issue by comparing Immersive Virtual Reality technology, the phenomenological approach, and Gerald Edelman's theory of Neural Darwinism. Virtual Reality has been used to throw light on some phenomena that cannot be studied experimentally in real life, and the results of (...) its simulations enrich the phenomenological discourse on the lived body. Virtual “Reality” seems to replicate—at least in part—the simulation mechanisms of our mind, thus favoring developments in the field of philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Este trabajo se centra en la creciente interacción entre la neurociencia y el derecho, delineando cuestiones de responsabilidad penal y en el marco más amplio de las interacciones epistemológicas entre diferentes campos del conocimiento. Ilustra la oportunidad de mantener un “debate” o diálogo peculiar entre las ramas de la ciencia consideradas y en el ámbito particular del neuroderecho. A continuación, el artículo presenta el método socrático como un enfoque dialéctico específico para orientar racionalmente estas conexiones epistemológicas, favorecer la comparación crítica (...) de perspectivas heterogéneas y, por tanto, poner de manifiesto espacios comunes fértiles en los que es posible alcanzar nuevos conocimientos interdisciplinarios. Por último, el artículo considera posturas significativas en el debate sobre el neuroderecho para mostrar que, en la medida en que se basan en la dialéctica y la refutación, pueden considerarse como fuertes manifestaciones de un diálogo socrático. Por lo tanto, aprovechando esta práctica, incluso en los sistemasjurídicos hay espacio para las pruebas y las aportaciones neurocientíficas, aunque esto conlleve una pizca de “neuromodestia”, pensamiento crítico y una defensa del método socrático. (shrink)

In this essay, I delineate the relationship between movement, thought, and the ability to speak. In neurology, the biomedical view constructs the image of the subaltern, a muted lifeform devoid of personality and whose life is not congruent with the concepts of autonomy and capacity. I propose to name these human beings “biomedical others.” An anomaly, this subaltern, is an underside of the philosophical totalization of subjectivity. In the biomedical framework, others are devoid of speech. Medicine, its institutes, and agents (...) in the healthcare system speak to them. However, the lives of biomedical others are based on gestures, facial expressions, and body commands that are enacted as micro-gestures. The urgency to give voice to the biomedical others is the ethical task of this essay. They are namely voiceless and powerless, evoking a different kind of ethics: fragility, minority, and silence. (shrink)

According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation (...) is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations. (shrink)

This commentary considers the fields of extrasensory perception (ESP) research and cognitive neuroscience, discussing points of conflict and domains where they may be complementary. ESP research challenges the assumption in cognitive neuroscience that the mind is the product of known physical processes in the brain. Cognitive neuroscience methods and tools applied to ESP research could benefit and bridge the gap between the two fields. Firstly, concurrently studying subjective experiences and neural activity during ESP tasks would allow us to better characterize (...) subjective states typically associated with ESP. Secondly, similarities between mind-wandering and free-response ESP experimental designs allow us to speculate on the potential implication of the default-mode network during the percipient’s experience. Finally, tools developed in computational neurolinguistics and natural language processing may become valuable to automatize judging procedures in free-response ESP paradigms such as remote viewing. Despite potentially incompatible assumptions about the mind and the brain, ESP research can gain new insights from cognitive neuroscience methods and approaches and can contribute in its own way to the study of human subjective experiences and cognition. (shrink)

The paper provides a neurophilosophical assessment of a controversy between two neuroeconomic models that compete to identify the putative object of neural utility: goods or actions. We raise two objections to the common view that sees the ‘good-based’ model prevailing over the ‘action-based’ model. First, we suggest extending neuroeconomic model discrimination to all of the models’ neurophilosophical assumptions, showing that action-based assumptions are necessary to explain real-world value-based decisions. Second, we show that the good-based model’s presumption of introducing a normative (...) neural definition of economic choice would arbitrarily restrict the domain of economic choice and consequently of economics. (shrink)

Wexler and Sullivan (2023) recommend integration as a guiding principle for translational neuroethics. We agree that collaboration between neuroethicists and other professionals can advance the fie...

As Herrera-Ferrá et al. (2023) carefully explain, the contentious legacy of human rights should not prevent the re-crafting of particular ethico-legal responsibilities and obligations focal to the...

In their article, Herrera-Ferrá et al. (2023) mention the publication by Yuste et al. (2021) where they pointed out that “currently, there is no international consensus on what constitutes neuro-ri...

The momentum for global neuroscience that is geopolitically-free has never been greater, and neuroethics holds a unique place in this context both in its translational and transnational forms.In th...

In the paper “Translational Neuroethics: A Vision for a More Integrated, Inclusive, and Impactful Field,” Wexler and Sullivan provide an insightful analysis of challenges within the field and how t...

Today, nearly two years after Wexler and Sullivan’s (2023) article was first published, the crucial questions discussed therein are all the more pertinent and troubling. The advent of novel interve...

Wexler and Specker Sullivan (2023) note that, “unbridled speculation can imperil the credibility of neuroethics, generate unrealistic expectations amongst different stakeholders, take up time that...

Neurorights were first articulated in response to perceived threats from advances in neurotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI). They purport to protect people’s cognitive capabilities agains...

Wexler and Specker (2023) offer a review of criticisms directed against what they describe as the relatively new field of neuroethics and offer as solution the development of a more “integrated, in...

Herrera-Ferrá et al.’s (2023) attention to the cultural context of the neurorights movement contributes to the growing conversation on establishing neurorights in response to advancements in neuros...

Anna Wexler and Laura Specker Sullivan (2023) draw on their positionality as Global North early career neuroethics scholars to initiate a meaningful and timely conversation on Translational Neuroet...

Wexler and Specker Sullivan (2023) reflect on the field of neuroethics by highlighting criticisms from both scholars within and outside the field. Among these criticisms, are claims that neuroethic...

Neurorights, as “new human rights,” have been increasingly recognized in the literature. In the Neurorights Initiative, these rights are supposed to be directed toward mental privacy, free will, pe...

In their valuable call-for-action article, Wexler and Specker Sullivan (2023) propose an integration–inclusion–impact axis for “translational neuroethics,” to face the challenges and criticisms tha...

In their article, Herrera-Ferra et al. (2023) highlight how the progress and implementation of neurotechnology, especially in conjunction with artificial intelligence, have revealed potential impli...

With the rapid advance in emerging neuroscience and neurotechnology, scholars and practitioners have urged the necessity of a governance framework and promoted the notion of “neurorights.” It refer...

The development and use of advanced and innovative neuroscience, neurotechnology and some forms of artificial intelligence have exposed potential threats to the human condition, including human rights. As a result, reconceptualizing or creating human rights (i.e. neurorights) has been proposed to address specific brain and mind issues like free will, personal identity and cognitive liberty. However, perceptions, interpretations and meanings of these issues—and of neurorights—may vary between countries, contexts and cultures, all relevant for an international-consensus definition and implementation of neurorights. (...) Thus, we encourage reflecting on the proactive inclusion of transnational, cross-cultural and contextual considerations and concerns to contribute to the global discourse. This inclusion does not mean endorsing ethical relativism but rather a call to foster a universal understanding of key concepts and concerns. Including contextual and cultural perspectives may truly anticipate global concerns which could be addressed while developing and implementing neurorights. Consequently, any ethical and/or legal regulatory framework(s) for the translational and transnational use of advanced neuroscience, neurotechnology and some forms of artificial intelligence intended to protect and safeguard human dignity should be contextually and culturally mindful, responsible, respectful and inclusive of not only human rights and fundamental freedoms but also of neurocognitive cultural diversity. (shrink)

As early-career neuroethicists, we come to the field of neuroethics at a unique moment: we are well-situated to consider nearly two decades of neuroethics scholarship and identify challenges that have persisted across time. But we are also looking squarely ahead, embarking on the next generation of exciting and productive neuroethics scholarship. In this article, we both reflect backwards and turn our gaze forward. First, we highlight criticisms of neuroethics, both from scholars within the field and outside it, that have focused (...) on speculation and lack of skepticism; the dearth of consideration of broader social issues such as justice and equality, both with regard to who speaks for neuroethics as a field and who benefits from its recommendations and findings; and the insufficient focus on the practical impact of our ethical work. Second, we embrace the concept of “translational neuroethics” to outline a vision for neuroethics that is integrated, inclusive, and impactful. Integration can help us identify more pertinent, real-world issues, and move away from speculation; inclusivity can help ensure that the questions we attend to are not merely relevant to a single subgroup but aim toward just distribution of benefits; and impact can help us think beyond guidelines and recommendations to focus on implementation. Our goal is for this call to action to help shape neuroethics into a discipline that develops rigorous research agendas through relationships with interdisciplinary partners, that is broadly inclusive and attends to issues beyond novel neurotechnologies, and that is devoted to the translation of scholarship into practice. (shrink)

The concept of ‘neurodiversity’ to speak of conditions such as autism, dyslexia, and others as differences, not disorders or pathologies, relies on a robust account of human flourishing that can incorporate these conditions. Conceptions of illness and well-being are always partially theological, whilst also having to be grounded in the empirical realities of the present time. Therefore, positive developmental psychology is a particularly apt field for developing a theology-informed psychology. This article argues that recent work in theology-engaged psychology of thriving, (...) as opposed to subjective flourishing, is the best approach to securing a vision of well-being for neurodiverse persons. (shrink)

Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral (...) indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious. (shrink)

Could emotions be a uniquely human phenomenon? One prominent theory in emotion science, Lisa Feldman Barrett’s “Theory of Constructed Emotion” (TCE), suggests they might be. The source of the sceptical challenge is that TCE links emotions to abstract concepts tracking socio-normative expectations, and other animals are unlikely to have such concepts. Barrett’s own response to the sceptical challenge is to relativize emotion to the perspective of an interpreter, but this is unpromising. A more promising response may be to amend the (...) theory, dropping the commitment to the abstract nature of emotion concepts and allowing that, like olfactory concepts, they have disjunctive sensory groundings. Even if other animals were emotionless, this would not imply they lack morally significant interests. Unconceptualized valenced experiences are a sufficient basis for morally significant interests, and such experiences may occur even in the absence of discrete, constructed emotions. (shrink)

This paper proposes to read cinema in the digital age as a new type of image, the neuroimage. Going back to Gilles Deleuze's cinema books and it is argued that the neuro-image is based in the future. The cinema of Alain Resnais is analyzed as a neuro-image and digital cinema.

Neuropragmatism offers a non-dualistic conception of experience from which scientific inquiries can provide resources for sociocultural critique. This reconstructive effort addresses what Emma Dowling calls the care crisis without succumbing to what Mike W. Martin calls therapeutic tyranny. This tyranny relies on problematic dualisms, between mind/body, mind/world, and fact/value, that are also found in neuropsychoanalysis. While pragmatism and psychoanalysis more generally share an evolutionary perspective and can overlap in therapeutic approaches, neuropsychoanalysis diverges from this effort in its dual-aspect monism and (...) positivistic conception of science. Where neuropsychoanalysis seeks to reconcile the first-person subjectivity of lived experience with the third-person objectivity of science, neuropragmatism offers reconstruction. In taking the neuropragmatic turn, neuropsychoanalysts can better utilize Freudian therapies in conjunction with active inference principles, such as the free-energy principle and allostasis. Along with neuropragmatism’s conception of experience as organism-environment dynamic engagement, neuropsychoanalysis can benefit from allostatic approaches to experience and inquiry without reducing experience to brute mechanism or denying the utility of such mechanisms for prediction and intervention. Understanding the value-ladenness of experience, primary and secondary, in everyday waking life and in reflective inquiry, empowers people to better care for themselves without succumbing to merely coping with neoliberal oppression. (shrink)

A strange dialectical reversal characterizes the oppositions which psychoanalysis posits against philosophy and neuroscience: what psychoanalysis intervenes with as a unique and missing quality of these subjects, reveals itself upon enquiry as already having been a feature of said subjects. This article first discusses the failed intervention of psychoanalysis within the perceived totalities and absolutes of German idealism. Psychoanalysis, founded on an ontological division and internal inconsistency with a retroactive logic, finds this internal contradiction already reflected within the supposed totalities (...) of Schelling and Hegel. Schelling’s “blind act,” a decision with no prior foundation that grounds an abstract identity-in-itself, appears as the counterpart to what Badiou calls the strictly “analytic act.” Hegel’s Science of Logic, in which the inconclusive interpenetration of being and nothing presupposes its own conclusion in the transitions to essence, and in which an internal incompleteness and contradiction are retroactively constitutive of the concept, similarly nullifies the intervention of psychoanalysis. Finally, precisely such a reversal is presented in neuroscience, where the constitutive contradiction of contingently functional neuronal formations in the adaptive “multiple demand” model of executive functioning repeats the contingent and self-contradicting psychoanalytic subject as being its own deference within linguistic, discursive formations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In considering the hopeful rhetoric that pervades the “nothing but” psychopharmacological approaches to depression—a contemporary version of what William James calls medical materialism—this article argues that only a thorough-going pluralist account of hope is a hope worth wanting. Medical materialist hope is better conceptualized as a variation of optimism, which assumes a single universe that is already the best of all possible universes, and thereby only promotes optimization of the status quo, rather than encourage a wider undertaking of a (...) variety of experiments in living. A pluralist hope, as opposed to optimism, cannot logically infer what the future will bring from a reigning scientific model of the brain. Rather, a pluralist hope is a passionate belief that a not-yet unimagined, and therefore indeterminate, future will meliorate current human ills should humans strenuously work toward achieving it. (shrink)

Anthropology of Consciousness, EarlyView.

Este artigo propõe-se a refletir sobre a relação da epistemologia instrumentalista de John Dewey com a neurociência cognitiva, a partir de sua crítica à psicologia tradicional. Realiza-se uma análise da tentativa de John Dewey de relacionar a verdade com a cognição destacando seus argumentos fundamentados no progresso da fisiologia e da psicologia, no avanço da biologia e no desenvolvimento do método experimental. O texto discute a possibilidade de o pragmatismo de Dewey contribuir com a neurociência cognitiva, já que a atitude (...) naturalista do autor em relação ao ser humano e todas as suas funções reforça que é a mente que toma as decisões e controla o comportamento. (shrink)

The vulnerability of the brain to being irreversibly damaged or compromised by injuries and diseases stems from the fact that terminally differentiated neurons are irreplaceable upon their demise....