Too much of a good thing? Enhancement and the burden of self-determination

Neuroethics 3 (2):109-119 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is a remedy available for many of our ailments: Psychopharmacology promises to alleviate unsatisfying memory, bad moods, and low self-esteem. Bioethicists have long discussed the ethical implications of enhancement interventions. However, they have not considered relevant evidence from psychology and economics. The growth in autonomy in many areas of life is publicized as progress for the individual. However, the broadening of areas at one’s disposal together with the increasing individualization of value systems leads to situations in which the range of options asks too much of the individual. I scrutinize whether increased self-determination and unbound possibilities are really in a person’s best interests. Evidence from psychology and economics challenges the assumption that unlimited autonomy is best in all cases. The responsibility for autonomous self-formation that comes with possibilities provided by neuro-enhancement developments can be a burden. To guarantee quality of life I suggest a balance of beneficence, support, and respect for autonomy.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Can self-validating neuroenhancement be autonomous?Jukka Varelius - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (1):51-59.
Human freedom and enhancement.Jan-Christoph Heilinger & Katja Crone - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (1):13-21.
Self-identity in emotion enhancement.Duoyi Fei - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-22.
Should we enhance self-esteem?Rebecca Roache - 2007 - Philosophica 79 (1):71-91.
Immigration and self-determination.Bas van der Vossen - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (3):270-290.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-05-07

Downloads
154 (#126,962)

6 months
15 (#184,854)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?