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Summary The ethical implications of cognitive enhancement are an area of substantial interest and controversy in biomedical ethics and neuroethics. Unlike genetic enhancement, where the debate remains largely speculative and anticipatory, purported cognitive enhancement via pharmacological means is already widely practiced. It remains controversial whether the desired effect of enhancement is achieved by the use of drugs like modfinil and methylphenidate. Among the primary ethical controversies with cognitive enhancement are concerns about personal identity and authenticity, stemming from the central and constitutive role of the mind and cognition in the self. Other issues include: safety concerns about psychostimulant pharmaceutical use without medical need, the possibility that cognitive enhancement is "cheating" and results in competitive advantage for enhanced individuals, implicit or explicit coercion, military use (reducing fatigue and enhancing alertness in warfighters, and "erasing" memories in PTSD), and moral enhancement.
Key works The ethical issues with cognitive enhancement tend to converge around two central themes: moral enhancement and authenticity of self. Persson&Savulescu argue for moral enhancement via cognitive enhancement as a moral imperative (Persson & Savulescu 2008Persson & Savulescu 2013), while Wolfendale argues for moral responsibility in the use of enhancement in the military (Wolfendale 2008). Goodman (Goodman 2010) addresses a central conceptual distinction in the authenticity/cheating debate: whether results or process matters more, i.e. if the ends are desirable, does it matter what means are used to achieve those ends? DeGrazia considers a similar theme in his discussion of authenticity and identity (Degrazia 2005), as does Levy, who argues that the authenticity of the self might itself be enhanced through pharmacological means (Levy 2011).
Introductions Illes & Sahakian 2011 Glannon 2008 Bostrom 2009 Turner & Sahakian 2006
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  1. Preparing for Our Enhanced Future.Colin Farrelly - manuscript
    (forthcoming) Journal of Medical Licensure and Discipline. Rapid advances in human genetics raise the prospect that one day we may be able to develop genetic enhancements to promote a diverse range of phenotypes (e.g. health, intelligence, behaviour, etc.). Perhaps the biggest challenge that genetic enhancements pose for medical practitioners is that they will compel us to re-think a good deal of the conventional wisdom of the status quo. Radical enhancements are likely to have this affect for a variety of reasons. (...)
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  2. Space Travel Does Not Constitute a Condition of Moral Exceptionality. That Which Obtains in Space Obtains Also on Earth!Maurizio Balistreri & Steven Umbrello - forthcoming - Medicina E Morale.
    There is a growing body of scholarship that is addressing the ethics, in particular, the bioethics of space travel and colonisation. Naturally, a variety of perspectives concerning the ethical issues and moral permissibility of different technological strategies for confronting the rigours of space travel and colonisation have emerged in the debate. Approaches ranging from genetically enhancing human astronauts to modifying the environments of planets to make them hospitable have been proposed as methods. This paper takes a look at a critique (...)
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  3. Smart Policy: Cognitive Enhancement and the Public Interest.Nick Bostrom - forthcoming - In Julian Savulescu, Ruud ter Muelen & Guy Kahane (eds.), Enhancing Human Capabilities. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Cognitive enhancement may be defined as the amplification or extension of core capacities of the mind through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing systems. Cognition refers to the processes an organism uses to organize information. These include acquiring information (perception), selecting (attention), representing (understanding) and retaining (memory) information, and using it to guide behavior (reasoning and coordination of motor outputs). Interventions to improve cognitive function may be directed at any of these core faculties.
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  4. A Symmetrical View of Disability and Enhancement.Stephen M. Campbell & David Wasserman - forthcoming - In Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Disability and enhancement are often treated as opposing concepts. To become disabled in some respect is to move away from those who are enhanced in that same respect; to become enhanced is to move away from the corresponding state of disability. This chapter examines how best to understand the concepts of disability and enhancement in this symmetrical way. After considering various candidates, two types of accounts are identified as the most promising: welfarist accounts and typical-functioning accounts. The authors ultimately defend (...)
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  5. Cognitive Enhancement and Social Mobility: Skepticism From India.Jayashree Dasgupta, Georgia Lockwood Estrin, Jesse Summers & Ilina Singh - forthcoming - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience:1-11.
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  6. Besser ist besser? Enhancement der Moral aus einer handlungstheoretischen Perspektive.Ezio Di Nucci - forthcoming - In Raphael van Riel, Ezio Di Nucci & Jan Schildmann (eds.), Enhancement der Moral. Mentis. pp. Kapitel 4.
    Enhancement ist eine tolle Sache: dieser Begriff ist notwendigerweise positiv (ein bisschen wie der traditionelle Gottbegriff), so dass wenn eine Änderung keine richtige Verbesserung hervorbringt, es auch kein richtiges Enhancement gewesen ist: sehr praktisch. Wie könnte man unter diesen Umständen überhaupt gegen Enhancement sein? Beim Enhancement geht es nicht mal um das plausible aber nicht unumstrittene „mehr ist besser“; vielmehr geht es um das tautologische „besser ist besser“.
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  7. The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement.Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - In Clausen Jens & Levy Neil (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer.
    This chapter reviews recent philosophical and neuroethical literature on the morality of moral neuroenhancements. It first briefly outlines the main moral arguments that have been made concerning moral status neuroenhancements. These are neurointerventions that would augment the moral status of human persons. It then surveys recent debate regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements: neurointerventions that augment that the moral desirability of human character traits, motives or conduct. This debate has contested, among other claims (i) Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s contention that there (...)
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  8. Enhancement & Desert.Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics.
    It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social-psychological research, and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. I examine three (...)
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  9. Cognitive Enhancement and Authenticity: Moving Beyond the Impasse.Emma C. Gordon - forthcoming - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy.
    In work on the ethics of cognitive enhancement use, there is a pervasive concern that such enhancement will—in some way—make us less authentic. Attempts to clarify what this concern amounts to and how to respond to it often lead to debates on the nature of the “true self” and what constitutes “genuine human activity”. This paper shows that a new and effective way to make progress on whether certain cases of cognitive enhancement problematically undermine authenticity is to make use of (...)
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  10. Psychedelics and Environmental Virtues.Nin Kirkham & Chris Letheby - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-25.
    The urgent need for solutions to critical environmental challenges is well attested, but often environmental problems are understood as fundamentally collective action problems. However, to solve to these problems, there is also a need to change individual behavior. Hence, there is a pressing need to inculcate in individuals the environmental virtues — virtues of character that relate to our environmental place in the world. We propose a way of meeting this need, by the judicious, safe, and controlled administration of “classic” (...)
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  11. Causing Disability, Causing Non-Disability: What's the Moral Difference?Joseph A. Stramondo & Stephen M. Campbell - forthcoming - In Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press.
    It may seem obvious that causing disability in another person is morally problematic in a way that removing or preventing a disability is not. This suggests that there is a moral asymmetry between causing disability and causing non-disability. This chapter investigates whether there are any differences between these two types of actions that might explain the existence of a general moral asymmetry. After setting aside the possibility that having a disability is almost always bad or harmful for a person (a (...)
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  12. Rationally Navigating Subjective Preferences in Memory Modification.Joseph Michael Vukov - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    Discussion of the ethics of memory modification technologies (MMTs) has often focused on questions about the limits of their permissibility. In the current paper, I focus primarily on a different issue: when (if ever) is it rational to prefer MMTs to alternative interventions? The question is crucial. Unless those who condone the use of MMTs offer guidance for navigating among various interventions, their account risks becoming a moral endorsement that says little about what one faced with the option of using (...)
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  13. Moral Perfection and the Demand for Human Enhancement.Adriana Warmbier - forthcoming - Ethics in Progress 2015 (No.1).
    In this article I discuss one of the most significant areas of bioethical interest, which is the problem of moral enhancement. Since I claim that the crucial issue in the current debate on human bioenhancement is the problem of agency, I bring out and examine the conditions of possibility of self-understanding, acting subjects attributing responsible authorship for their actions to themselves. I shall argue that the very idea of moral enhancement, properly understood, fails to justify the claims that enhancing the (...)
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  14. Performance in the Workplace: a Critical Evaluation of Cognitive Enhancement.Cengiz Acarturk & Baris Mucen - 2022 - NanoEthics 16 (1):107-114.
    The popular debates about the future organization of work through artificial intelligence technologies focus on the replacement of human beings by novel technologies. In this essay, we oppose this statement by closely following what has been developed as AI technologies and analyzing how they work, specifically focusing on research that may impact work organizations. We develop this argument by showing that the recent research and developments in AI technologies focus on developing accurate and precise performance models, which in turn shapes (...)
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  15. Two Internal Critiques for Theists Who Oppose Moral Enhancement on a Process Virtue Basis.Abram Brummett & Parker Crutchfield - 2022 - Bioethics 36 (4):367-373.
    Some bioconservatives reject the use of biotechnology for moral enhancement while simultaneously purporting to accept standard theism and process virtue (STPV). Standard theism holds that God is a personal, omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, transcendent being. Process virtue holds that intrinsically valuable virtue can only be obtained through a specific process and not by means of biotechnological shortcuts. We describe two internal critiques, one conceptual and the other moral, that arise by combining standard theism and process virtue to reject moral enhancement. First, (...)
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  16. Moral Neuroenhancement for Prisoners of War.Blake Hereth - 2022 - Neuroethics 15 (1):1-20.
    Moral agential neuroenhancement can transform us into better people. However, critics of MB raise four central objections to MANEs use: It destroys moral freedom; it kills one moral agent and replaces them with another, better agent; it carries significant risk of infection and illness; it benefits society but not the enhanced person; and it’s wrong to experiment on nonconsenting persons. Herein, I defend MANE’s use for prisoners of war fighting unjustly. First, the permissibility of killing unjust combatants entails that, in (...)
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  17. Kant and the Enhancement Debate: Imperfect Duties and Perfecting Ourselves.Brian A. Chance - 2021 - Wiley: Bioethics 35 (8):801-811.
    This essay develops a Kantian approach to the permissibility of biomedical physical, cognitive, and moral enhancement. Kant holds that human beings have an imperfect duty to promote their physical, cognitive, and moral perfection. While an agent’s individual circumstances may limit the means she may permissibly use to enhance herself, whether biomedically or otherwise, I argue (1) that biomedical means of enhancing oneself are, generally speaking, both permissible and meritorious from a Kantian perspective. Despite often being equally permissible, I also argue (...)
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  18. Moral Enhancement and the Public Good.Parker Crutchfield - 2021 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    Currently, humans lack the cognitive and moral capacities to prevent the widespread suffering associated with collective risks, like pandemics, climate change, or even asteroids. In Moral Enhancement and the Public Good, Parker Crutchfield argues for the controversial, and initially counterintuitive claim that everyone should be administered a substance that makes us better people. Furthermore, he argues that it should be administered without our knowledge. That is, moral bioenhancement should be both compulsory and covert. Crutchfield demonstrates how our duty to future (...)
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  19. Social Justice Theories as the Basis for Public Policy on Psychopharmacological Cognitive Enhancement.Astrid Maria Elfferich - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Bioethics / Revue canadienne de bioéthique 4 (1).
    Psychopharmacological cognitive enhancements could lead to a higher quality of life of healthy individuals with lower cognitive capacities, but the current regulatory framework does not seem to enable access to this group. This article discusses why Sen’s Capability Approach could open up such access, while two other modern social justice theories – utilitarianism and Rawls’ Justice as Fairness – could not. In short, the utilitarian approach is proven to be inadequate, due to practical reasons and having a low chance of (...)
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  20. The Ethics of Biomedical Military Research: Therapy, Prevention, Enhancement, and Risk.Alexandre Erler & Vincent C. Müller - 2021 - In Daniel Messelken & David Winkler (eds.), Health care in contexts of risk, uncertainty, and hybridity. Berlin: Springer. pp. 235-252.
    What proper role should considerations of risk, particularly to research subjects, play when it comes to conducting research on human enhancement in the military context? We introduce the currently visible military enhancement techniques (1) and the standard discussion of risk for these (2), in particular what we refer to as the ‘Assumption’, which states that the demands for risk-avoidance are higher for enhancement than for therapy. We challenge the Assumption through the introduction of three categories of enhancements (3): therapeutic, preventive, (...)
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  21. Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement and Cheapened Achievement: A New Dilemma.Emma C. Gordon & Lucy Dunn - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):409-421.
    Recent discussions of cognitive enhancement often note that drugs and technologies that improve cognitive performance may do so at the risk of “cheapening” our resulting cognitive achievements Arguing about bioethics, Routledge, London, 2012; Harris in Bioethics 25:102–111, 2011). While there are several possible responses to this worry, we will highlight what we take to be one of the most promising—one which draws on a recent strand of thinking in social and virtue epistemology to construct an integrationist defence of cognitive enhancement.. (...)
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  22. Ethical Analysis on the Application of Neurotechnology for Human Augmentation in Physicians and Surgeons.Soaad Hossain & Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed - 2021 - In Kohei Arai, Supriya Kapoor & Rahul Bhatia (eds.), Proceedings of the Future Technologies Conference (FTC) 2020. Switzerland: pp. 78-99.
    With the shortage of physicians and surgeons and increase in demand worldwide due to situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing interest in finding solutions to help address the problem. A solution to this problem would be to use neurotechnology to provide them augmented cognition, senses and action for optimal diagnosis and treatment. Consequently, doing so can negatively impact them and others. We argue that applying neurotechnology for human enhancement in physicians and surgeons can cause injustices, and (...)
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  23. Bioenhanced “Virtues” May Threaten Personal Identity.Gina Lebkuecher, Kit Rempala, Sydney Samoska, Marley Hornewer & Joseph Vukov - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):117-119.
    Fabiano argues that virtue theory offers the best “safety framework” for mitigating the risks of moral enhancement (1). He advances five desiderata for an ideal safety framework and then explains how virtue theory satisfies each. Among these desiderata is the “preservation of identity” (1). Fabiano argues that moral enhancement can safely preserve personal identity when carried out within the framework of virtue theory. We suggest Fabiano's argument for this conclusion falls short, since contra Fabiano’s claim, enhancing virtues may not preserve—and (...)
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  24. Revisiting Moral Bioenhancement and Autonomy.Ji-Young Lee - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):529-539.
    Some have claimed that moral bioenhancement undermines freedom and authenticity – thereby making moral bioenhancement problematic or undesirable – whereas others have said that moral bioenhancement does not undermine freedom and authenticity – thereby salvaging its ethical permissibility. These debates are characterized by a couple of features. First, a positive relationship is assumed to hold between these agency-related concepts and the ethical permissibility of moral bioenhancement. Second, these debates are centered around individualistic conceptions of agency, like free choice and authenticity, (...)
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  25. Autonomy and the Limits of Cognitive Enhancement.Jonathan Lewis - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (1):15-22.
    In the debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, proponents have found it difficult to refute the concern, voiced by certain bioconservatives, that cognitive enhancement violates the autonomy of the enhanced. However, G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu have attempted not only to avoid autonomy-based bioconservative objections, but to argue that cognition-enhancing biomedical interventions can actually enhance autonomy. In response, this paper has two aims: firstly, to explore the limits of their argument; secondly, and more importantly, to develop (...)
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  26. Can ‘Eugenics’ Be Defended?Francesca Minerva, Diana S. Fleischman, Peter Singer, Nicholas Agar, Jonathan Anomaly & Walter Veit - 2021 - Monash Bioethics Review 39 (1):60-67.
  27. A Nietzschean Critique of Liberal Eugenics.Donovan Miyasaki - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    Ethical debates about liberal eugenics frequently focus on the supposed unnaturalness of its means and possible harm to autonomy. I present a Nietzsche-inspired critique focusing on intention rather than means and harm to abilities rather than to autonomy. I first critique subjective eugenics, the selection of extrinsically valuable traits, drawing on Nietzsche’s notion of ‘slavish’ values reducible to the negation of another’s good. Subjective eugenics slavishly evaluates traits relative to a negatively evaluated norm (eg, above-average intelligence), disguising a harmful intention (...)
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  28. Rationality and Cognitive Enhancement.Joseph Vukov - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (4):597-618.
    When is it rational to undergo cognitive enhancement? In the case of what I’ll call massive cognitive enhancement, my answer is never. The reason is that one must base one’s decision to undergo massive cognitive enhancement on what I’ll call either phenomenal or non-phenomenal outcomes. If the former, the choice is not rational because massive cognitive enhancements are transformative and, I’ll argue with Paul, transformative experiences cannot be chosen rationally. If the latter, the choice is not rational because it ought (...)
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  29. Great Minds Think Different: Preserving Cognitive Diversity in an Age of Gene Editing.Jonny Anomaly, Julian Savulescu & Christopher Gyngell - 2020 - Bioethics 34 (1):81-89.
  30. AI Assistants and the Paradox of Internal Automaticity.William A. Bauer & Veljko Dubljević - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (3):303-310.
    What is the ethical impact of artificial intelligence assistants on human lives, and specifically how much do they threaten our individual autonomy? Recently, as part of forming an ethical framework for thinking about the impact of AI assistants on our lives, John Danaher claims that if the external automaticity generated by the use of AI assistants threatens our autonomy and is therefore ethically problematic, then the internal automaticity we already live with should be viewed in the same way. He takes (...)
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  31. Limitless? Imaginaries of Cognitive Enhancement and the Labouring Body.Brian P. Bloomfield & Karen Dale - 2020 - History of the Human Sciences 33 (5):37-63.
    This article seeks to situate pharmacological cognitive enhancement as part of a broader relationship between cultural understandings of the body-brain and the political economy. It is the body of the worker that forms the intersection of this relationship and through which it comes to be enacted and experienced. In this article, we investigate the imaginaries that both inform and are reproduced by representations of pharmacological cognitive enhancement, drawing on cultural sources such as newspaper articles and films, policy documents, and pharmaceutical (...)
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  32. Conceptual Definitions and Meaningful Generalizability in Cognitive Enhancement.Christian Carrozzo - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (4):261-263.
  33. Engendering Moral Post‐Persons: A Novel Self‐Help Strategy.Parker Crutchfield - 2020 - Bioethics 34 (7):679-686.
    Humans are morally deficient in a variety of ways. Some of these deficiencies threaten the continued existence of our species. For example, we appear to be incapable of responding to climate change in ways that are likely to prevent the consequent suffering. Some people are morally better than others, but we could all be better. The price of not becoming morally better is that when those events that threaten us occur, we will suffer from them. If we can prevent this (...)
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  34. Service and Status Competition May Help Explain Perceived Ethical Acceptability.Hugh Desmond - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (4):258-260.
    The dominant view on the ethics of cognitive enhancement (CE) is that CE is beholden to the principle of autonomy. However, this principle does not seem to reflect commonly held ethical judgments about enhancement. Is the principle of autonomy at fault, or should common judgments be adjusted? Here I argue for the first, and show how common judgments can be justified as based on a principle of service.
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  35. Neuroenhancement.Alexandre Erler & Cynthia Forlini - 2020 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
    Entry on "Neuroenhancement" in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
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  36. Technological Moral Enhancement or Traditional Moral Progress? Why Not Both?Joao Fabiano - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (6):405-411.
    A new argument has been made against moral enhancement by authors who are otherwise in favour of human enhancement. Additionally, they share the same evolutionary toolkit for analysing human traits as well as the belief that our current morality is unfit to deal with modern problems, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. The argument is put forward by Buchanan and Powell and states that other paths to moral progress are enough to deal with these problems. Given the likely costs (...)
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  37. Artificial Intelligence as a Socratic Assistant for Moral Enhancement.Francisco Lara & Jan Deckers - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (3):275-287.
    The moral enhancement of human beings is a constant theme in the history of humanity. Today, faced with the threats of a new, globalised world, concern over this matter is more pressing. For this reason, the use of biotechnology to make human beings more moral has been considered. However, this approach is dangerous and very controversial. The purpose of this article is to argue that the use of another new technology, AI, would be preferable to achieve this goal. Whilst several (...)
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  38. The Continuity of BCI-Mediated and Conventional Action.Daniel Lim - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (1):59-61.
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  39. DIY Brain Stimulation: On the Difficulty of Measuring Effectiveness and its Ethical Implications.Ying-Tung Lin - 2020 - Ethical Dimensions of Commercial and DIY Neurotechnologies.
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  40. Against AI-Improved Personal Memory.Björn Lundgren - 2020 - In Aging between Participation and Simulation. pp. 223–234.
    In 2017, Tom Gruber held a TED talk, in which he presented a vision of improving and enhancing humanity with AI technology. Specifically, Gruber suggested that an AI-improved personal memory (APM) would benefit people by improving their “mental gain”, making us more creative, improving our “social grace”, enabling us to do “science on our own data about what makes us feel good and stay healthy”, and, for people suffering from dementia, it “could make a difference between a life of isolation (...)
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  41. Could You Merge With AI? Reflections on the Singularity and Radical Brain Enhancement.Cody Turner & Susan Schneider - 2020 - In Markus Dirk Dubber, Frank Pasquale & Sunit Das (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-325.
  42. Can Self-Validating Neuroenhancement Be Autonomous?Jukka Varelius - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (1):51-59.
    Consider that an individual improves her capacities by neuroscientific means. It turns out that, besides altering her in the way(s) she intended, the enhancement also changes her personality in significant way(s) she did not foresee. Yet the person endorses her new self because the neuroenhancement she underwent changed her. Can the person’s approval of her new personality be autonomous? While questions of autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in philosophical literature on human enhancement, the problem just described—henceforth (...)
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  43. Neuroenhancement, the Criminal Justice System, and the Problem of Alienation.Jukka Varelius - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (3):325-335.
    It has been suggested that neuroenhancements could be used to improve the abilities of criminal justice authorities. Judges could be made more able to make adequately informed and unbiased decisions, for example. Yet, while such a prospect appears appealing, the views of neuroenhanced criminal justice authorities could also be alien to the unenhanced public. This could compromise the legitimacy and functioning of the criminal justice system. In this article, I assess possible solutions to this problem. I maintain that none of (...)
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  44. Would Nonconsensual Criminal Neurorehabilitation Express a more Degrading Attitude Towards Offenders than Consensual Criminal Neurorehabilitation?Jukka Varelius - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):291-302.
    It has been proposed that reoffending could be reduced by manipulating the neural underpinnings of offenders’ criminogenic mental features with what have been called neurocorrectives. The legitimacy of such use of neurotechnology – criminal neurorehabilitation, as the use is called – is usually seen to presuppose valid consent by the offenders subjected to it. According to a central criticism of nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation, nonconsensual use of neurocorrectives would express a degrading attitude towards offenders. In this article, I consider this criticism (...)
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  45. The Internet as Cognitive Enhancement.Cristina Voinea, Constantin Vică, Emilian Mihailov & Julian Savulescu - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2345-2362.
    The Internet has been identified in human enhancement scholarship as a powerful cognitive enhancement technology. It offers instant access to almost any type of information, along with the ability to share that information with others. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the enhancement potential of the Internet. We argue that unconditional access to information does not lead to cognitive enhancement. The Internet is not a simple, uniform technology, either in its composition, or in its use. We will (...)
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  46. BCI-Mediated Action, Blame, and Responsibility.Joseph Vukov & Kit Rempala - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 11.
    Rainey et al. (forthcoming) discuss the complications that arise with assigning responsibility for brain computer interface (BCI)-mediated actions. Because BCI-mediated actions can differ from non-BCI-mediated actions in terms of control and foreseeability, the authors suggest that our ethical and legal evaluation of these actions may differ in important ways. While we take no issue with the authors’ discussion or conclusion, we also recognize the difficulty of grappling with the relationship between control, foreseeability, and moral responsibility practices, even without the additional (...)
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  47. Can Attitudes Toward Genome Editing Better Inform Cognitive Enhancement Policy?Davide Battisti, Alessandra Gasparetto & Mario Picozzi - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 10 (1):59-61.
    The article by Conrad et al. (AJOB Neuroscience, 2019, 10:1) does not take into account another, still hypothetical, procedure for cognitive enhancement (CE) which would be appropriate to consider in the surveys, i.e. the possibility to genetically enhance the cognitive abilities of a future individual using genome editing techniques. In this case, the conclusions of the article in the context of the “self-others difference” and “safety/naturalness” would be questioned. In fact, the results of the hypothetical surveys with the variant “genome (...)
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  48. Compulsory Moral Bioenhancement Should Be Covert.Parker Crutchfield - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (1):112-121.
    Some theorists argue that moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory. I take this argument one step further, arguing that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration ought to be covert rather than overt. This is to say that it is morally preferable for compulsory moral bioenhancement to be administered without the recipients knowing that they are receiving the enhancement. My argument for this is that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration is a matter (...)
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  49. Would Moral Enhancement Limit Freedom?Antonio Diéguez & Carissa Véliz - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):29-36.
    The proposal of moral enhancement as a valuable means to face the environmental, technological and social challenges that threaten the future of humanity has been criticized by a number of authors. One of the main criticisms has been that moral enhancement would diminish our freedom. It has been said that moral enhancement would lead enhanced people to lose their ‘freedom to fall’, that is, it would prevent them from being able to decide to carry out some morally bad actions, and (...)
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  50. Nonconsensual Neurocorrectives and Bodily Integrity: A Reply to Shaw and Barn.Thomas Douglas - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (1):107-118.
    In this issue, Elizabeth Shaw and Gulzaar Barn offer a number of replies to my arguments in ‘Criminal Rehabilitation Through Medical Intervention: Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily Integrity’, Journal of Ethics. In this article I respond to some of their criticisms.
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