46 found
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  1. Is Whistle-Blowing Compatible with Employee Loyalty?Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 85 (2):263-275.
    Whistle-blowing would appear to involve a conflict between employee loyalty and protection of public interest. Several business ethicists have, however, argued that this conflict is indeed merely apparent. According to the central argument to that effect, when the nature of employee loyalty is understood correctly, it becomes clear that whistle-blowing does not threaten employees' loyalty to their employer. This is because blowing the whistle about one's employer's wrongdoing and being loyal to them serves the same goal, the moral good of (...)
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  2.  59
    Medical Expertise, Existential Suffering and Ending Life.Jukka Varelius - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2):104-107.
    In this article, I assess the position that voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide ought not to be accepted in the cases of persons who suffer existentially but who have no medical condition, because existential questions do not fall within the domain of physicians’ professional expertise. I maintain that VE and PAS based on suffering arising from medical conditions involves existential issues relevantly similar to those confronted in connection with existential suffering. On that basis I conclude that if VE and PAS (...)
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  3.  44
    The Value of Autonomy in Medical Ethics.Jukka Varelius - 2006 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 9 (3):377-388.
    This articles assesses the arguments that bioethicists have presented for the view that patient’ autonomy has value over and beyond its instrumental value in promoting the patients’ wellbeing. It argues that this view should be rejected and concludes that patients’ autonomy should be taken to have only instrumental value in medicine.
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  4.  98
    Illness, Suffering and Voluntary Euthanasia.Jukka Varelius - 2007 - Bioethics 21 (2):75–83.
    It is often accepted that we may legitimately speak about voluntary euthanasia only in cases of persons who are suffering because they are incurably injured or have an incurable disease. This article argues that when we consider the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia, we have no good reason to concentrate only on persons who are ill or injured and suffering.
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  5.  69
    Execution by Lethal Injection, Euthanasia, Organ-Donation and the Proper Goals of Medicine.Jukka Varelius - 2007 - Bioethics 21 (3):140–149.
    ABSTRACTIn a recent issue of this journal, David Silver and Gerald Dworkin discuss the physicians' role in execution by lethal injection. Dworkin concludes that discussion by stating that, at that point, he is unable to think of an acceptable set of moral principles to support the view that it is illegitimate for physicians to participate in execution by lethal injection that would not rule out certain other plausible moral judgements, namely that euthanasia is under certain conditions legitimate and that organ‐donation (...)
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  6.  19
    Is Ethical Expertise Possible?Jukka Varelius - 2008 - Medicine Health Care and Philosophy 11 (2):127-132.
    Services of ethics committees are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as health care, public administration, business, law, engineering, and scientific research. It is taken that as their members have expertise in ethics, these committees can have valuable contributions to make in solving practical moral problems. It has, however, also been maintained that it is simply absurd to claim that one has some special knowledge and skills in moral matters; in connection with moral questions there is no (...)
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  7.  4
    Is Ethical Expertise Possible?Jukka Varelius - 2008 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 11 (2):127-132.
    Services of ethics committees are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as health care, public administration, business, law, engineering, and scientific research. It is taken that as their members have expertise in ethics, these committees can have valuable contributions to make in solving practical moral problems. It has, however, also been maintained that it is simply absurd to claim that one has some special knowledge and skills in moral matters; in connection with moral questions there is no (...)
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  8.  72
    Minimally Conscious State and Human Dignity.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Neuroethics 2 (1):35-50.
    Recent progress in neurosciences has improved our understanding of chronic disorders of consciousness. One example of this advancement is the emergence of the new diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS). The central characteristic of MCS is impaired consciousness. Though the phenomenon now referred to as MCS pre-existed its inclusion in diagnostic classifications, the current medical ethical concepts mainly apply to patients with normal consciousness and to non-conscious patients. Accordingly, how we morally should stand with persons in minimally conscious state (...)
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  9. Voluntary Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and the Right to Do Wrong.Jukka Varelius - 2013 - HEC Forum 25 (3):1-15.
    It has been argued that voluntary euthanasia (VE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are morally wrong. Yet, a gravely suffering patient might insist that he has a moral right to the procedures even if they were morally wrong. There are also philosophers who maintain that an agent can have a moral right to do something that is morally wrong. In this article, I assess the view that a suffering patient can have a moral right to VE and PAS despite the moral (...)
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  10.  41
    Ethics Consultation and Autonomy.Jukka Varelius - 2008 - Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (1):65-76.
    Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. (...)
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  11.  34
    Autonomy, Wellbeing, and the Case of the Refusing Patient.Jukka Varelius - 2005 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 9 (1):117-125.
    A moral problem arises when a patient refuses a treatment that would save her life. Should the patient be treated against her will? According to an influential approach to questions of biomedical ethics, certain considerations pertaining to individual autonomy provide a solution to this problem. According to this approach, we should respect the patient’s autonomy and, since she has made an autonomous decision against accepting the treatment, she should not be treated. This article argues against the view that our answer (...)
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  12.  58
    Autonomy, Subject-Relativity, and Subjective and Objective Theories of Well-Being in Bioethics.Jukka Varelius - 2003 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 24 (5):363-379.
    Among the different approaches to questions of biomedical ethics, there is a view that stresses the importance of a patient’s right to make her own decisions in evaluative questions concerning her own well-being. This approach, the autonomy-based approach to biomedical ethics, has usually led to the adoption of a subjective theory of well-being on the basis of its commitment to the value of autonomy and to the view that well-being is always relative to a subject. In this article, it is (...)
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  13.  86
    Voluntary Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and the Goals of Medicine.Jukka Varelius - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):121 – 137.
    It is plausible that what possible courses of action patients may legitimately expect their physicians to take is ultimately determined by what medicine as a profession is supposed to do and, consequently, that we can determine the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide on the basis of identifying the proper goals of medicine. This article examines the main ways of defining the proper goals of medicine found in the recent bioethics literature and argues that they cannot provide a (...)
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  14.  44
    Active and Passive Physician‐Assisted Dying and the Terminal Disease Requirement.Jukka Varelius - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (9):663-671.
    The view that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should be made available for terminal patients only is typically warranted by reference to the risks that the procedures are seen to involve. Though they would appear to involve similar risks, the commonly endorsed end-of-life practices referred to as passive euthanasia are available also for non-terminal patients. In this article, I assess whether there is good reason to believe that the risks in question would be bigger in the case of voluntary (...)
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  15.  78
    Respect for Autonomy, Advance Directives, and Minimally Conscious State.Jukka Varelius - 2011 - Bioethics 25 (9):505-515.
    In this article, I consider whether the advance directive of a person in minimally conscious state ought to be adhered to when its prescriptions conflict with her current wishes. I argue that an advance directive can have moral significance after its issuer has succumbed to minimally conscious state. I also defend the view that the patient can still have a significant degree of autonomy. Consequently, I conclude that her advance directive ought not to be applied. Then I briefly assess whether (...)
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  16.  54
    Mental Illness, Natural Death, and Non-Voluntary Passive Euthanasia.Jukka Varelius - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-14.
    When it is considered to be in their best interests, withholding and withdrawing life-supporting treatment from non-competent physically ill or injured patients – non-voluntary passive euthanasia, as it has been called – is generally accepted. A central reason in support of the procedures relates to the perceived manner of death they involve: in non-voluntary passive euthanasia death is seen to come about naturally. When a non-competent psychiatric patient attempts to kill herself, the mental health care providers treating her are obligated (...)
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  17.  48
    Allhoff on Business Bluffing.Jukka Varelius - 2006 - Journal of Business Ethics 65 (2):163-171.
    The moral status of business bluffing is a controversial issue. On the one hand, bluffing would seem to be relevantly similar to lying and deception. Because of this, business bluffing can be taken to be an activity that is at least prima facie morally condemnable. On the other hand, it has often been claimed that in business bluffing is part of the game and that therefore there is nothing morally questionable in business bluffing. In a recent issue of this journal, (...)
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  18.  75
    On the Relevance of an Argument as Regards the Role of Existential Suffering in the End-of-Life Context.Jukka Varelius - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2):114-116.
    In an article recently published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, I assessed the position that voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide can be appropriate only in cases of persons who are suffering unbearably because they are ill or injured, not in cases of unbearably distressed persons whose suffering is caused by their conviction that their life will never again be worth living. More precisely, I considered one possible way of defending that position, the argument that the latter kind of distress—to (...)
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  19. Minimally Conscious State, Human Dignity, and the Significance of Species: A Reply to Kaczor.Jukka Varelius - 2011 - Neuroethics (Browse Results) 6 (1):85-95.
    Abstract In a recent issue of Neuroethics , I considered whether the notion of human dignity could help us in solving the moral problems the advent of the diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS) has brought forth. I argued that there is no adequate account of what justifies bestowing all MCS patients with the special worth referred to as human dignity. Therefore, I concluded, unless that difficulty can be solved we should resort to other values than human dignity in (...)
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  20.  88
    Ending Life, Morality, and Meaning.Jukka Varelius - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):559-574.
    Opponents of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide often maintain that the procedures ought not to be accepted because ending an innocent human life would both be morally wrong in itself and have unfortunate consequences. A gravely suffering patient can grant that ending his life would involve such harm but still insist that he would have reason to continue living only if there were something to him in his abstaining from ending his life. Though relatively rarely, the notion of meaning of (...)
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  21.  43
    On the Moral Acceptability of Physician‐Assisted Dying for Non‐Autonomous Psychiatric Patients.Jukka Varelius - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (4):227-233.
    Several authors have recently suggested that the suffering caused by mental illness could provide moral grounds for physician-assisted dying. Yet they typically require that psychiatric-assisted dying could come to question in the cases of autonomous, or rational, psychiatric patients only. Given that also non-autonomous psychiatric patients can sometimes suffer unbearably, this limitation appears questionable. In this article, I maintain that restricting psychiatric-assisted dying to autonomous, or rational, psychiatric patients would not be compatible with endorsing certain end-of-life practices commonly accepted in (...)
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  22.  45
    Collective Informed Consent and Decision Power.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Science and Engineering Ethics 15 (1):39-50.
    It has been suggested that, in addition to individual level decision-making, informed consent procedures could be used in collective decision-making too. One of the main criticisms directed at this suggestion concerns decision-making power. It is maintained that consent is a veto power concept and that, as such, it is not appropriate for collective decision-making. This paper examines this objection to collective informed consent. It argues that veto power informed consent can have some uses in the collective level and that when (...)
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  23.  25
    Physician-Assisted Dying and Two Senses of an Incurable Condition.Jukka Varelius - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (9):601-604.
    It is commonly accepted that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide can be allowed, if at all, only in the cases of patients whose conditions are incurable. Yet, there are different understandings of when a patient’s condition is incurable. In this article, I consider two understandings of the notion of an incurable condition that can be found in the recent debate on physician-assisted dying. According to one of them, a condition is incurable when it is known that there is no (...)
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  24.  14
    On the Prospects of Collective Informed Consent.Jukka Varelius - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (1):35–44.
    It has been suggested that collective informed consent procedures could be used in solving moral problems arising in connection with such collective arrangements as land use planning, business administration, and developing new technology. Critics have however argued that informed consent is not an appropriate method for collective moral decision-making for three reasons. Firstly, informed consent procedures only allow the affected parties to choose between rejecting and accepting certain predetermined options, while those parties should be allowed to take part in the (...)
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  25.  27
    On Taylor on Autonomy and Informed Consent.Jukka Varelius - 2006 - Journal of Value Inquiry 40 (4):451-459.
    In contemporary medical ethics, it is widely accepted that concern for individual autonomy provides the ethical foundation for the doctrine of informed consent. It is taken that treating a competent patient is morally acceptable only if she has given her informed consent to being treated, because failing to secure the patient’s informed consent to her treatment would violate the patient’s autonomy. In a recent issue of this journal, James Stacey Taylor argues that this conventional view is mistaken. Taylor maintains that (...)
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  26.  69
    Pascal's Wager and Deciding About the Life-Sustaining Treatment of Patients in Persistent Vegetative State.Jukka Varelius - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (2):277-285.
    An adaptation of Pascal’s Wager argument has been considered useful in deciding about the provision of life-sustaining treatment for patients in persistent vegetative state. In this article, I assess whether people making such decisions should resort to the application of Pascal’s idea. I argue that there is no sufficient reason to give it an important role in making the decisions.
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  27.  28
    Mental Illness, Lack of Autonomy, and Physician-Assisted Death.Jukka Varelius - 1st ed. 2015 - In Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi (eds.), New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Springer Verlag. pp. 59-77.
    In this chapter, I consider the idea that physician-assisted death might come into question in the cases of psychiatric patients who are incapable of making autonomous choices about ending their lives. I maintain that the main arguments for physician-assisted death found in recent medical ethical literature support physician-assisted death in some of those cases. After assessing several possible criticisms of what I have argued, I conclude that the idea that physicianassisted death can be acceptable in some cases of psychiatric patients (...)
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  28.  7
    Advance Directives and the Descendant Argument.Jukka Varelius - 2018 - HEC Forum 30 (1):1-11.
    By issuing an advance treatment directive, an autonomous person can formally express what kinds of treatment she wishes and does not wish to receive in case she becomes ill or injured and unable to autonomously decide about her treatment. While many jurisdictions and medical associations endorse them, advance treatment directives have also been criticized. According to an important criticism, when a person irreversibly loses her autonomy what she formerly autonomously desired ceases to be of importance in deciding about her treatment. (...)
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  29.  15
    Life’s Meaning and Late Life Rational Suicide.Jukka Varelius - 2016 - In Robert E. McCue & Meera Balasubramaniam (eds.), Rational Suicide in the Elderly. Springer. pp. 83-98.
    Suicidal ideation would often appear to relate to ideas about life’s meaninglessness. In this chapter, I consider the suicidal thoughts of an elderly person in light of the recent philosophical discussion on the meaning of life. I start by distinguishing between two importantly different questions about life’s meaning and explaining how they differ from certain other issues sometimes treated as questions about the meaning of life. Then I address the two questions about life’s meaning in turn, connecting them to the (...)
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  30.  7
    Health and Autonomy.Jukka Varelius - 2004 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 8 (2):221-230.
    Individual autonomy is a prominent value in Western medicine and medical ethics, and there it is often accepted that the only way to pay proper respect to autonomy is to let the patients themselves determine what is good for them. Adopting this approach has, however, given rise to some unwanted results, thus motivating a quest for an objective conception of health. Unfortunately, the purportedly objective conceptions of health have failed in objectivity, and if a conception of health is not acceptable (...)
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  31.  27
    Still Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):67-72.
    A response to the commentaries presented by Eric Matthews and Julian Savulescu on Jukka Varelius, 'Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder.’ Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2009 Vol. 16 (1): 35-52.
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  32.  8
    Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder: Mental Illness.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):35-52.
    What mental disorder means is controversial. I attempt to solve that controversy by applying the method of defining a phenomenon in terms of the goals we have for demarcating that phenomenon from other phenomena to the case of mental disorder. I thus address the question about the nature of mental disorder by paying attention to the goals we have for demarcating mental disorder. I maintain that these goals, which embody the reasons why we consider mental disorder a significant phenomenon for (...)
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  33.  21
    Is the Non-Rivalrousness of Intellectual Objects a Problem for the Moral Justification of Economic Rights to Intellectual Property?Jukka Varelius - 2015 - Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (4):895-906.
    It is often argued that the fact that intellectual objects—objects like ideas, inventions, concepts, and melodies—can be used by several people simultaneously makes intellectual property rights impossible or particularly difficult to morally justify. In this article, I assess the line of criticism of intellectual ownership in connection with a central category of intellectual property rights, economic rights to intellectual property. I maintain that it is unconvincing.
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  34.  20
    Is the Expiration of Intellectual Property Rights a Problem for Non-Consequentialist Theories of Intellectual Property?Jukka Varelius - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (4):345-357.
    The expiration of intellectual property rights has been seen to amount to a problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property. In this article, I assess whether the difficulty is real. I maintain that, as things are at least, there is no sufficient reason to believe that the termination of intellectual property rights is an insurmountable problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property rights.
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  35.  36
    On Taylor's Justification of Medical Informed Consent.Jukka Varelius - 2012 - Bioethics 26 (4):207-214.
    In contemporary Western biomedical ethics, informed consent practices are commonly justified in terms of the intrinsic value of patient autonomy. James Stacey Taylor maintains that this conception of the moral grounding of medical informed consent is mistaken. On the basis of his reasoning to that effect, Taylor argues that medical informed consent is justified by the instrumental value of personal autonomy. In this article, I examine whether Taylor's justification of medical informed consent is plausible.
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  36.  7
    Execution by Lethal Injection, Euthanasia, Organ‐Donation and the Proper Goals of Medicine.Jukka Varelius - 2007 - Bioethics 21 (3):140-149.
    ABSTRACTIn a recent issue of this journal, David Silver and Gerald Dworkin discuss the physicians' role in execution by lethal injection. Dworkin concludes that discussion by stating that, at that point, he is unable to think of an acceptable set of moral principles to support the view that it is illegitimate for physicians to participate in execution by lethal injection that would not rule out certain other plausible moral judgements, namely that euthanasia is under certain conditions legitimate and that organ‐donation (...)
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  37.  34
    Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):35-52.
    What mental disorder means is controversial. I attempt to solve that controversy by applying the method of defining a phenomenon in terms of the goals we have for demarcating that phenomenon from other phenomena to the case of mental disorder. I thus address the question about the nature of mental disorder by paying attention to the goals we have for demarcating mental disorder. I maintain that these goals, which embody the reasons why we consider mental disorder a significant phenomenon for (...)
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  38.  15
    Do Patents and Copyrights Give Their Holders Excessive Control Over the Material Property of Others?Jukka Varelius - 2014 - Ethics and Information Technology 16 (4):299-305.
    The moral acceptability of intellectual property rights is often assessed by comparing them to central instances of rights to material property. Critics of intellectual ownership claim to have found significant differences. One of the dissimilarities pertains to the extent of the control intellectual property rights bestow on their holders over the material property of others. The main idea of the criticism of intellectual ownership built around that dissimilarity is that, in light of the comparison with material property rights, the power (...)
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  39.  19
    Two Challenges for Dignity as an Expressive Norm.Jukka Varelius - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):327-340.
    The concept of dignity figures prominently in legal and moral discussion on such topics as human rights, euthanasia, abortion, and criminal punishment. Yet the notion has been criticized for being indeterminate and either insufficient or redundant (or both) in justifying the kinds of legal and moral rights and views its proponents use it to vindicate. The criticisms have inspired some novel conceptions of dignity. One of them is Tarunabh Khaitan’s proposal that dignity should be understood as an expressive norm. In (...)
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  40.  8
    Minimally Conscious State, Human Dignity, and the Significance of Species: A Reply to Kaczor.Jukka Varelius - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (1):85-95.
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  41.  11
    Refusing Life-Saving Treatment, Adaptive Preferences, and Autonomy.Jukka Varelius - 2013 - In Juha Räikkä & Jukka Varelius (eds.), Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life. Springer. pp. 183--197.
    Consider a case of a patient receiving life-supporting treatment. With appropriate care the patient could be kept alive for several years. Yet his latest prognosis also indicates that his mental abilities will deteriorate significantly and that ultimately he will become incapable of understanding what happens around and to him. Despite his illness, the patient has been eager to live. However, he finds the prospect that he is now faced with devastating. He undergoes an unconscious process that results in his finding (...)
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  42.  1
    Introduction.Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi - 1st ed. 2015 - In Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi (eds.), New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Springer Verlag.
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  43.  14
    Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life.Juha Räikkä & Jukka Varelius (eds.) - 2013 - Springer.
    This volume gathers together previously unpublished articles focusing on the relationship between preference adaptation and autonomy in connection with human enhancement and in the end-of-life context.
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  44. New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia.Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi (eds.) - 2015 - Springer Verlag.
    Introduction Cholbi, Michael (et al.) Pages 1-10 -/- Assisted Dying and the Proper Role of Patient Autonomy Bullock, Emma C. Pages 11-25 -/- Preventing Assistance to Die: Assessing Indirect Paternalism Regarding Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Schramme, Thomas Pages 27-40 -/- Autonomy, Interests, Justice and Active Medical Euthanasia Savulescu, Julian Pages 41-58 -/- Mental Illness, Lack of Autonomy, and Physician-Assisted Death Varelius, Jukka Pages 59-77 -/- Euthanasia for Mental Suffering Raus, Kasper (et al.) Pages 79-96 -/- Assisted Dying for (...)
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  45. Suffering at the End of Life.Jukka Varelius - forthcoming - Bioethics.
    In the end‐of‐life context, alleviation of the suffering of a distressed patient is usually seen as a, if not the, central goal for the medical personnel treating her. Yet it has also been argued that suffering should be seen as a part of good dying. More precisely, it has been maintained that alleviating a dying patient’s suffering can make her unable to take care of practical end‐of‐life matters, deprive her of an opportunity to ask questions about and find meaning in (...)
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  46. Still Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder: MatthewsEric,1936-Against Definition.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):67-72.