Hyperintensional metaphysics

Philosophical Studies 171 (1):149-160 (2014)

Authors
Daniel Nolan
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
In the last few decades of the twentieth century there was a revolution in metaphysics: the intensional revolution. Many metaphysicians rejected the doctrine, associated with Quine and Davidson, that extensional analyses and theoretical resources were the only acceptable ones. Metaphysicians embraced tools like modal and counterfactual analyses, claims of modal and counterfactual dependence, and entities such as possible worlds and intensionally individuated properties and relations. The twenty-first century is seeing a hypterintensional revolution. Theoretical tools in common use carve more finely than by necessary equivalence: two pieces of language can apply to the same entities across all possible worlds but not be equivalent; thoughts can be necessarily equivalent in truth value but not synonymous. This paper argues that hyperintensional resources are valuable in metaphysics outside theories of representation, and discusses some promising areas of hyperintensional metaphysics
Keywords Metaphysics  Hyperintensionality  Intensionality  Impossible worlds
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0251-2
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Ground.Michael J. Raven - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (5):322-333.
Williamson on Counterpossibles.Berto Francesco, David Ripley, Graham Priest & Rohan French - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713.
Prioritizing Platonism.Kelly Trogdon & Sam Cowling - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

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