There Are No Universal Rules for Induction

Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777 (2010)
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Abstract

In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive inferences are delineated as those conforming to some universal schema. An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic, non-probabilistic systems in physics is posed and it is argued that Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction.

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John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

What distinguishes data from models?Sabina Leonelli - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):22.
What distinguishes data from models?Sabina Leonelli - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):22.

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References found in this work

A material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
Causation as folk science.John Norton - 2003 - Philosophers' Imprint 3:1-22.
Causation as folk science.John D. Norton - 2003 - In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Philosophers' Imprint. Oxford University Press.
The Dome: An Unexpectedly Simple Failure of Determinism.John D. Norton - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):786-798.

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