Stalnaker on Mathematical Information

Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):187-204 (2009)
Abstract
Robert Stalnaker has argued that mathematical information is information about the sentences and expressions of mathematics. I argue that this metalinguistic account is open to a variant of Alonzo Church’s translation objection and that Stalnaker’s attempt to get around this objection is not successful. If correct, this tells not only against Stalnaker’s account of mathematical truths, but against any metalinguistic account of truths that are both necessary and informative.
Keywords necessary truths  mathematical information  possible worlds semantics  logical omniscience  metalinguistic information  epistemic possibilities
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2009.tb00090.x
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Reference and Reflexivity.John Perry - 2009 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.

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