Mathematical Logic

The purpose of this paper is to examine in detail a particularly interesting pair of first-order theories. In addition to clarifying the overall geography of notions of equivalence between theories, this simple example yields two surprising conclusions about the relationships that theories might bear to one another. In brief, we see that theories lack both the Cantor-Bernstein and co-Cantor-Bernstein properties.

I provide an examination and comparison of modal theories for underwriting different non-modal theories of sets. I argue that there is a respect in which the `standard' modal theory for set construction---on which sets are formed via the successive individuation of powersets---raises a significant challenge for some recently proposed `countabilist' modal theories (i.e. ones that imply that every set is countable). I examine how the countabilist can respond to this issue via the use of regularity axioms and raise some questions (...) about this approach. I argue that by comparing them with the `standard' uncountabilist theory, a new approach that brings in arbitrariness rather than the strict controls of forcing is desirable. (shrink)

Considering the set of natural numbers N, then in the context of Peano axioms, we find a fundamental contradiction from a not-finitist point of view.

This presentation includes a complete bibliography of John Corcoran’s publications devoted at least in part to Aristotle’s logic. Sections I–IV list 20 articles, 43 abstracts, 3 books, and 10 reviews. It starts with two watershed articles published in 1972: the Philosophy & Phenomenological Research article that antedates Corcoran’s Aristotle’s studies and the Journal of Symbolic Logic article first reporting his original results; it ends with works published in 2015. A few of the items are annotated with endnotes connecting them with (...) other work. In addition, Section V “Discussions” is a nearly complete secondary bibliography of works describing, interpreting, extending, improving, supporting, and criticizing Corcoran’s work: 8 items published in the 1970s, 22 in the 1980s, 39 in the 1990s, 56 in the 2000s, and 65 in the current decade. The secondary bibliography is annotated with endnotes: some simply quoting from the cited item, but several answering criticisms and identifying errors. As is evident from the Acknowledgements sections, all of Corcoran’s publications benefited from correspondence with other scholars, most notably Timothy Smiley, Michael Scanlan, and Kevin Tracy. All of Corcoran’s Greek translations were done in consultation with two or more classicists. Corcoran never published a sentence without discussing it with his colleagues and students. REQUEST: Please send errors, omissions, and suggestions. I am especially interested in citations made in non-English publications. (shrink)

. In our research about Fuzzy Time and modeling time, "Unexpected Hanging Paradox" plays a major role. Here, we compare this paradox to the Zeno Paradox and the relations of them with our standard models of continuum and Fuzzy numbers. To do this, we review the project "Fuzzy Time and Possible Impacts of It on Science" and introduce a new way in order to approach the solutions for these paradoxes. Additionally, we have a more general discussion about paradoxes, as Philosophical (...) back ground of the subject and in this way, we introduce the concepts of General View, the first picture, BBF-General View. -/- . (shrink)

Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this account can be fruitfully applied in the (...) evaluation of major foundational approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization of Hilbert’s program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended form due to Feferman and Schütte. -/- Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only omega-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly, computable entailment is a Pi-1-1 complete relation, and hence employing it commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than Pi-1-1-CA0. (shrink)

Classical physics and quantum physics suggest two meta-physical types of reality: the classical notion of a objectively definite reality with properties "all the way down," and the quantum notion of an objectively indefinite type of reality. The problem of interpreting quantum mechanics (QM) is essentially the problem of making sense out of an objectively indefinite reality. These two types of reality can be respectively associated with the two mathematical concepts of subsets and quotient sets (or partitions) which are category-theoretically dual (...) to one another and which are developed in two mathematical logics, the usual Boolean logic of subsets and the more recent logic of partitions. Our sense-making strategy is "follow the math" by showing how the logic and mathematics of set partitions can be transported in a natural way to Hilbert spaces where it yields the mathematical machinery of QM--which shows that the mathematical framework of QM is a type of logical system over ℂ. And then we show how the machinery of QM can be transported the other way down to the set-like vector spaces over ℤ₂ showing how the classical logical finite probability calculus (in a "non-commutative" version) is a type of "quantum mechanics" over ℤ₂, i.e., over sets. In this way, we try to make sense out of objective indefiniteness and thus to interpret quantum mechanics. (shrink)

En este trabajo matemático-filosófico se estudian cuatro tópicos de la Lógica matemática: El método de construcción de modelos llamado Ultraproductos, la Propiedad de Interpolación de Craig, las Álgebras booleanas y los Órdenes parciales separativos. El objetivo principal del mismo es analizar la importancia que tienen dichos tópicos para el estudio de los fundamentos de la matemática, desde el punto de vista del platonismo matemático. Para cumplir con tal objetivo se trabajará en el ámbito de la Matemática, de la Metamatemática y (...) de la Filosofía de la matemática. El desarrollo de la investigación arrojó como resultado que tales tópicos son muy importantes para el estudio de los fundamentos de la matemática, desde el punto de vista del platonismo matemático, y en el trabajo se explica detalladamente con abundantes ejemplos el porqué (al final de cada sección y al final del mismo). (shrink)

Introduction to mathematical logic, part 2.Textbook for students in mathematical logic and foundations of mathematics. Platonism, Intuition, Formalism. Axiomatic set theory. Around the Continuum Problem. Axiom of Determinacy. Large Cardinal Axioms. Ackermann's Set Theory. First order arithmetic. Hilbert's 10th problem. Incompleteness theorems. Consequences. Connected results: double incompleteness theorem, unsolvability of reasoning, theorem on the size of proofs, diophantine incompleteness, Loeb's theorem, consistent universal statements are provable, Berry's paradox, incompleteness and Chaitin's theorem. Around Ramsey's theorem.

In this article, we provide three generators of propositional formulae for arbitrary languages, which uniformly sample three different formulae spaces. They take the same three parameters as input, namely, a desired depth, a set of atomics and a set of logical constants (with specified arities). The first generator returns formulae of exactly the given depth, using all or some of the propositional letters. The second does the same but samples up-to the given depth. The third generator outputs formulae with exactly (...) the desired depth and all the atomics in the set. To make the generators uniform (i.e. to make them return every formula in their space with the same probability), we will prove various cardinality results about those spaces. (shrink)

This Gentle Introduction is very much still work in progress. Roughly aimed at those who want something a bit more discursive, slower-moving, than Awodey's or Leinster's excellent books. -/- The current [Jan 2018] version is 291pp.

We isolate two abstract determinacy theorems for games of length $\omega_1$ from work of Neeman and use them to conclude, from large-cardinal assumptions and an iterability hypothesis in the region of measurable Woodin cardinals thatif the Continuum Hypothesis holds, then all games of length $\omega_1$ which are provably $\Delta_1$ -definable from a universally Baire parameter are determined;all games of length $\omega_1$ with payoff constructible relative to the play are determined; andif the Continuum Hypothesis holds, then there is a model of (...) ${\mathsf{ZFC}}$ containing all reals in which all games of length $\omega_1$ definable from real and ordinal parameters are determined. (shrink)

We show the consistency, relative to the appropriate supercompactness or strong compactness assumptions, of the existence of a non-supercompact strongly compact cardinal $\kappa _0$ (the least measurable cardinal) exhibiting properties which are impossible when $\kappa _0$ is supercompact. In particular, we construct models in which $\square _{\kappa ^+}$ holds for every inaccessible cardinal $\kappa $ except $\kappa _0$, GCH fails at every inaccessible cardinal except $\kappa _0$, and $\kappa _0$ is less than the least Woodin cardinal.

We show that Dependent Choice is a sufficient choice principle for developing the basic theory of proper forcing, and for deriving generic absoluteness for the Chang model in the presence of large cardinals, even with respect to $\mathsf {DC}$ -preserving symmetric submodels of forcing extensions. Hence, $\mathsf {ZF}+\mathsf {DC}$ not only provides the right framework for developing classical analysis, but is also the right base theory over which to safeguard truth in analysis from the independence phenomenon in the presence of (...) large cardinals. We also investigate some basic consequences of the Proper Forcing Axiom in $\mathsf {ZF}$, and formulate a natural question about the generic absoluteness of the Proper Forcing Axiom in $\mathsf {ZF}+\mathsf {DC}$ and $\mathsf {ZFC}$. Our results confirm $\mathsf {ZF} + \mathsf {DC}$ as a natural foundation for a significant portion of “classical mathematics” and provide support to the idea of this theory being also a natural foundation for a large part of set theory. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser's essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson's Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hajek proved it in the fuzzy logic BL for Grzegorczyk's variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as non-total non-functional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural logic and for a much (...) weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson's R (with arithmetic operations also interpreted as mere relations). Our result is based on a structural version of the undecidability argument introduced by Kleene and we show that it goes well beyond the scope of the Boolean, intuitionistic, or fuzzy logic. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser’s essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson’s Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hájek proved it in the fuzzy logic BL for Grzegorczyk’s variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as nontotal nonfunctional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural logic and for a much (...) weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson’s R (with arithmetic operations also interpreted as mere relations). Our result is based on a structural version of the undecidability argument introduced by Kleene and we show that it goes well beyond the scope of the Boolean, intuitionistic, or fuzzy logic. (shrink)

We explore the notion of a measure in a mereological structure and we deal with the difficulties arising. We show that measure theory on connection spaces is closely related to measure theory on the class of ortholattices and we present an approach akin to Dempster’s and Shafer’s. Finally, the paper contains some suggestions for further research.

We prove that the existence of a measurable cardinal is equivalent to the existence of a normal space whose modal logic coincides with the modal logic of the Kripke frame isomorphic to the powerset of a two element set.

Frege's definition of the real numbers, as envisaged in the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, is fatally flawed by the inconsistency of Frege's ill-fated Basic Law V. We restate Frege's definition in a consistent logical framework and investigate whether it can provide a logical foundation of real analysis. Our conclusion will deem it doubtful that such a foundation along the lines of Frege's own indications is possible at all.

Logical inferentialism maintains that the formal rules of inference fix the meanings of the logical terms. The categoricity problem points out to the fact that the standard formalizations of classical logic do not uniquely determine the intended meanings of its logical terms, i.e., these formalizations are not categorical. This means that there are different interpretations of the logical terms that are consistent with the relation of logical derivability in a logical calculus. In the case of the quantificational logic, the categoricity (...) problem is generated by the finite nature of the standard calculi and one direction in which it can be solved is to strengthen the deductive systems by adding infinite rules (such as the ω-rule), i.e., to construct a full formalization. Another main direction is to provide a natural semantics for the standard rules of inference, i.e., a semantics for which these rules are categorical. My aim in this paper is to analyze some recent approaches for solving the categoricity problem and to argue that a logical inferentialist should accept the infinite rules of inference for the first order quantifiers, since our use of the expressions “all” and “there is” leads us beyond the concrete and finite reasoning, and human beings do sometimes employ infinite rules of inference in their reasoning. (shrink)

We present a novel argumentation-based method for finding and analyzing communities in social media on the Web, where a community is regarded as a set of supported opinions that might be in conflict. Based on their stance, we identify argumentative coalitions to define them; then, we apply a similarity-based evaluation method over the set of arguments in the coalition to determine the level of cohesion inherent to each community, classifying them appropriately. Introducing conflict points and attacks between coalitions based on (...) argumentative (dis)similarities to model the interaction between communities leads to considering a meta-argumentation framework where the set of coalitions plays the role of the set of arguments and where the attack relation between the coalitions is assigned a particular strength which is inherited from the arguments belonging to the coalition. Various semantics are introduced to consider attacks’ strength to particularize the effect of the new perspective. Finally, we analyze a case study where all the elements of the formal construction of the formalism are exercised. (shrink)

One of the most expected properties of a logical system is that it can be algebraizable, in the sense that an algebraic counterpart of the deductive machinery could be found. Since the inception of da Costa's paraconsistent calculi, an algebraic equivalent for such systems have been searched. It is known that these systems are non self-extensional (i.e., they do not satisfy the replacement property). More than this, they are not algebraizable in the sense of Blok-Pigozzi. The same negative results hold (...) for several systems of the hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). Because of this, these logics are uniquely characterized by semantics of non-deterministic kind. This paper offers a solution for two open problems in the domain of paraconsistency, in particular connected to algebraization of LFIs, by obtaining several LFIs weaker than C1, each of one is algebraizable in the standard Lindenbaum-Tarski's sense by a suitable variety of Boolean algebras extended with operators. This means that such LFIs satisfy the replacement property. The weakest LFI satisfying replacement presented here is called RmbC, which is obtained from the basic LFI called mbC. Some axiomatic extensions of RmbC are also studied, and in addition a neighborhood semantics is defined for such systems. It is shown that RmbC can be defined within the minimal bimodal non-normal logic E+E defined by the fusion of the non-normal modal logic E with itself. Finally, the framework is extended to first-order languages. RQmbC, the quantified extension of RmbC, is shown to be sound and complete w.r.t. BALFI semantics. (shrink)

A well-ordered society faces a crisis whenever a sufficient number of noncompliers enter into the political system. This has the potential to destabilize liberal democratic political order. This article provides a formal analysis of two competing solutions to the problem of political stability offered in the public reason liberalism literature—namely, using public reason or using convergence discourse to restore liberal democratic political order in the well-ordered society. The formal analyses offered in this article show that using public reason fails completely, (...) and using convergent discourse, although doing better, has its own critical limitations that have not been previously recognized properly. (shrink)

We systematically study conservation theorems on theories of semi-classical arithmetic, which lie in-between classical arithmetic $\mathsf {PA}$ and intuitionistic arithmetic $\mathsf {HA}$. Using a generalized negative translation, we first provide a structured proof of the fact that $\mathsf {PA}$ is $\Pi _{k+2}$ -conservative over $\mathsf {HA} + {\Sigma _k}\text {-}\mathrm {LEM}$ where ${\Sigma _k}\text {-}\mathrm {LEM}$ is the axiom scheme of the law-of-excluded-middle restricted to formulas in $\Sigma _k$. In addition, we show that this conservation theorem is optimal in the (...) sense that for any semi-classical arithmetic T, if $\mathsf {PA}$ is $\Pi _{k+2}$ -conservative over T, then ${T}$ proves ${\Sigma _k}\text {-}\mathrm {LEM}$. In the same manner, we also characterize conservation theorems for other well-studied classes of formulas by fragments of classical axioms or rules. This reveals the entire structure of conservation theorems with respect to the arithmetical hierarchy of classical principles. (shrink)

Rybakov (1984a) proved that the admissible rules of IPC are decidable. We give a proof of the same theorem, using the same core idea, but couched in the many notions that have been developed in the mean time. In particular, we illustrate how the argument can be interpreted as using refinements of the notions of exactness and extendibility.

The prevalent interpretation of Gödel’s Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of the underlying mathematical theorem depends on several arbitrary formalisation choices. In this paper I examine the theorem’s dependency regarding Gödel numberings. I introduce deviant numberings, yielding provability predicates satisfying Löb’s conditions, which result in provable consistency sentences. According to the main result of this paper (...) however, these “counterexamples” do not refute the theorem’s prevalent interpretation, since once a natural class of admissible numberings is singled out, invariance is maintained. (shrink)

We provide an application of a sequent calculus framework to the formalization of definite descriptions. It is a continuation of research undertaken in [20, 22]. In the present paper a so-called free description theory is examined in the context of different kinds of free logic, including systems applied in computer science and constructive mathematics for dealing with partial functions. It is shown that the same theory in different logics may be formalised by means of different rules and gives results of (...) varying strength. For all presented calculi a constructive cut elimination is provided. (shrink)

We prove a strengthened version of Shavrukov’s result on the non-isomorphism of diagonalizable algebras of two $\Sigma _1$ -sound theories, based on the improvements previously found by Adamsson. We then obtain several corollaries to the strengthened result by applying it to various pairs of theories and obtain new non-isomorphism examples. In particular, we show that there are no surjective homomorphisms from the algebra $(\mathfrak {L}_T, \Box _T\Box _T)$ onto the algebra $(\mathfrak {L}_T, \Box _T)$. The case of bimodal diagonalizable algebras (...) is also considered. We give several examples of pairs of theories with isomorphic diagonalizable algebras but non-isomorphic bimodal diagonalizable algebras. (shrink)

In 1978, Yu. F. Borisov presented an axiom system using a few basic assumptions and four explicit axioms, the fourth being a formulation of the relativity principle; and he demonstrated that this axiom system had (up to choice of units) only two models: a relativistic one in which worldview transformations are Poincaré transformations and a classical one in which they are Galilean. In this paper, we reformulate Borisov’s original four axioms within an intuitively simple, but strictly formal, first-order logic framework, (...) and convert his basic background assumptions into explicit axioms. Instead of assuming that the structure of physical quantities is the field of real numbers, we assume only that they form an ordered field. This allows us to investigate how Borisov’s theorem depends on the structure of quantities. We demonstrate (as our main contribution) how to construct Euclidean, Galilean, and Poincaré models of Borisov’s axiom system over every non-Archimedean field. We also demonstrate the existence of an infinite descending chain of models and transformation groups in each of these three cases, something that is not possible over Archimedean fields. As an application, we note that there is a model of Borisov’s axioms that satisfies the relativity principle, and in which the worldview transformations are Euclidean isometries. Over the field of reals it is easy to eliminate this model using natural axioms concerning time’s arrow and the absence of instantaneous motion. In the case of non-Archimedean fields, however, the Euclidean isometries appear intrinsically as worldview transformations in models of Borisov’s axioms and neither the assumption of time’s arrow, nor the rejection of instantaneous motion, can eliminate them. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. We prove rigidity results for large classes of corona algebras, assuming the Proper Forcing Axiom. In particular, we prove that a conjecture of Coskey and Farah holds for all separable [math]-algebras with the metric approximation property and an increasing approximate identity of projections.

We write $\mathcal {S}_n(A)$ for the set of permutations of a set A with n non-fixed points and $\mathrm {{seq}}^{1-1}_n(A)$ for the set of one-to-one sequences of elements of A with length n where n is a natural number greater than $1$. With the Axiom of Choice, $|\mathcal {S}_n(A)|$ and $|\mathrm {{seq}}^{1-1}_n(A)|$ are equal for all infinite sets A. Among our results, we show, in ZF, that $|\mathcal {S}_n(A)|\leq |\mathrm {{seq}}^{1-1}_n(A)|$ for any infinite set A if ${\mathrm {AC}}_{\leq n}$ is (...) assumed and this assumption cannot be removed. In the other direction, we show that $|\mathrm {{seq}}^{1-1}_n(A)|\leq |\mathcal {S}_{n+1}(A)|$ for any infinite set A and the subscript $n+1$ cannot be reduced to n. Moreover, we also show that “ $|\mathcal {S}_n(A)|\leq |\mathcal {S}_{n+1}(A)|$ for any infinite set A” is not provable in ZF. (shrink)

We prove that the first-order logic of CZF is intuitionistic first-order logic. To do so, we introduce a new model of transfinite computation (Set Register Machines) and combine the resulting notion of realisability with Beth semantics. On the way, we also show that the propositional admissible rules of CZF are exactly those of intuitionistic propositional logic.

The complexity of equivalence relations has received much attention in the recent literature. The main tool for such endeavour is the following reducibility: given equivalence relations R and S on natural numbers, R is computably reducible to S if there is a computable function f:ω→ω that induces an injective map from R-equivalence classes to S-equivalence classes. In order to compare the complexity of equivalence relations which are computable, researchers considered also feasible variants of computable reducibility, such as the polynomial-time reducibility. (...) In this work, we explore Peq, the degree structure generated by primitive recursive reducibility on primitive recursive equivalence relations with infinitely many equivalence classes. In contrast with all other known degree structures on equivalence relations, we show that Peq has much more structure: e.g., we show that it is a dense distributive lattice. On the other hand, we also offer evidence of the intricacy of Peq, proving, e.g., that the structure is neither rigid nor homogeneous. (shrink)

The Denjoy integral is an integral that extends the Lebesgue integral and can integrate any derivative. In this paper, it is shown that the graph of the indefinite Denjoy integral f↦∫xaf is a coanalytic non-Borel relation on the product space M[a,b]×C[a,b], where M[a,b] is the Polish space of real-valued measurable functions on [a,b] and where C[a,b] is the Polish space of real-valued continuous functions on [a,b]. Using the same methods, it is also shown that the class of indefinite Denjoy integrals, (...) called ACG∗[a,b], is a coanalytic but not Borel subclass of the space C[a,b], thus answering a question posed by Dougherty and Kechris. Some basic model theory of the associated spaces of integrable functions is also studied. Here the main result is that, when viewed as an ℝ[X]-module with the indeterminate X being interpreted as the indefinite integral, the space of continuous functions on the interval [a,b] is elementarily equivalent to the Lebesgue-integrable and Denjoy-integrable functions on this interval, and each is stable but not superstable, and that they all have a common decidable theory when viewed as ℚ[X]-modules. (shrink)

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis (THAs) occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed (recursive) iterations of the Turing Jump but below ATR $_{0}$ (and so $\Pi _{1}^{1}$ -CA $_{0}$ or the hyperjump). There is a long history of proof theoretic principles which are THAs. Until Barnes, Goh, and Shore [ta] revealed an array of theorems in graph theory living in this neighborhood, there was only one mathematical denizen. In (...) this paper we introduce a new neighborhood of theorems which are almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis (ATHAs). When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own they are very weak. We generalize several conservativity classes ( $\Pi _{1}^{1}$, r- $\Pi _{2}^{1}$, and Tanaka) and show that all our examples (and many others) are conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion theoretic ways as well. We provide denizens, both mathematical and logical. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in Montalbán [2011] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong (THA) or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second order arithmetic. (shrink)

Natural Formalization proposes a concrete way of expanding proof theory from the meta-mathematical investigation of formal theories to an examination of “the concept of the specifically mathematical proof.” Formal proofs play a role for this examination in as much as they reflect the essential structure and systematic construction of mathematical proofs. We emphasize three crucial features of our formal inference mechanism: (1) the underlying logical calculus is built for reasoning with gaps and for providing strategic directions, (2) the mathematical frame (...) is a definitional extension of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory and has a hierarchically organized structure of concepts and operations, and (3) the construction of formal proofs is deeply connected to the frame through rules for definitions and lemmas. To bring these general ideas to life, we examine, as a case study, proofs of the Cantor–Bernstein Theorem that do not appeal to the principle of choice. A thorough analysis of the multitude of “different” informal proofs seems to reduce them to exactly one. The natural formalization confirms that there is one proof, but that it comes in two variants due to Dedekind and Zermelo, respectively. In this way it enhances the conceptual understanding of the represented informal proofs. The formal, computational work is carried out with the proof search system AProS that serves as a proof assistant and implements the above inference mechanism; it can be fully inspected at (see link below). (shrink)

We present an analogue of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for systems of second-order arithmetic. Whereas Gödel showed that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi^0_1$-sound and $\Sigma^0_1$-definable do not prove their own $\Pi^0_1$-soundness, we prove that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi^1_1$-sound and $\Sigma^1_1$-definable do not prove their own $\Pi^1_1$-soundness. Our proof does not involve the construction of a self-referential sentence but rather relies on ordinal analysis.

We study the phenomenon of merging of opinions for computationally limited Bayesian agents from the perspective of algorithmic randomness. When they agree on which data streams are algorithmically random, two Bayesian agents beginning the learning process with different priors may be seen as having compatible beliefs about the global uniformity of nature. This is because the algorithmically random data streams are of necessity globally regular: they are precisely the sequences that satisfy certain important statistical laws. By virtue of agreeing on (...) what data streams are algorithmically random, two Bayesian agents can thus be taken to concur on what global regularities they expect to see in the data. We show that this type of compatibility between priors suffices to ensure that two computable Bayesian agents will reach inter-subjective agreement with increasing information. In other words, it guarantees that their respective probability assignments will almost surely become arbitrarily close to each other as the number of observations increases. Thus, when shared by computable Bayesian learners with different subjective priors, the beliefs about uniformity captured by algorithmic randomness provably lead to merging of opinions. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print.

One shortcoming of the chain rule is that it does not iterate: it gives the derivative of f(g(x)), but not (directly) the second or higher-order derivatives. We present iterated differentials and a version of the multivariable chain rule which iterates to any desired level of derivative. We first present this material informally, and later discuss how to make it rigorous (a discussion which touches on formal foundations of calculus). We also suggest a finite calculus chain rule (contrary to Graham, Knuth (...) and Patashnik's claim that "there's no corresponding chain rule of finite calculus"). (shrink)

We study the relative computational power of structures related to the ordered field of reals, specifically using the notion of generic Muchnik reducibility. We show that any expansion of the reals by a continuous function has no more computing power than the reals, answering a question of Igusa, Knight, and Schweber [7]. On the other hand, we show that there is a certain Borel expansion of the reals that is strictly more powerful than the reals and such that any Borel (...) quotient of the reals reduces to it. (shrink)

Every branch of mathematics has its subject matter, and one of the distinguishing features of logic is that so many of its fundamental objects of study are rooted in language. The subject deals with terms, expressions, formulas, theorems, and proofs. When we speak about these notions informally, we are talking about things that can be written down and communicated with symbols. One of the goals of mathematical logic is to introduce formal definitions that capture our intuitions about such objects and (...) enable us to reason about them precisely. At the most basic level, syntactic objects can be viewed as strings of symbols. For concreteness, we can identify symbols with particular set-theoretic objects, but for most purposes, it doesn't matter what they are; all that is needed is that they are distinct from one another. (shrink)

We prove two general results about the preservation of extendible and $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals under a wide class of forcing iterations (Theorems 5.4 and 7.5). As applications we give new proofs of the preservation of Vopěnka’s Principle and $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals under Jensen’s iteration for forcing the GCH [17], previously obtained in [8, 27], respectively. We prove that $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals are preserved by forcing with standard Easton-support iterations for any possible $\Delta _2$ -definable behaviour of the power-set function on (...) regular cardinals. We show that one can force proper class-many disagreements between the universe and HOD with respect to the calculation of successors of regular cardinals, while preserving $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals. We also show, assuming the GCH, that the class forcing iteration of Cummings–Foreman–Magidor for forcing $\diamondsuit _{\kappa ^+}^+$ at every $\kappa $ [10] preserves $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals. We give an optimal result on the consistency of weak square principles and $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals. In the last section prove another preservation result for $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals under very general (not necessarily definable or weakly homogeneous) class forcing iterations. As applications we prove the consistency of $C^{(n)}$ -extendible cardinals with $\mathrm {{V}}=\mathrm {{HOD}}$, and also with $\mathrm {GA}$ (the Ground Axiom) plus $\mathrm {V}\neq \mathrm {HOD}$, the latter being a strengthening of a result from [14]. (shrink)

For given Boolean algebras $\mathbb {A}$ and $\mathbb {B}$ we endow the space $\mathcal {H}(\mathbb {A},\mathbb {B})$ of all Boolean homomorphisms from $\mathbb {A}$ to $\mathbb {B}$ with various topologies and study convergence properties of sequences in $\mathcal {H}(\mathbb {A},\mathbb {B})$. We are in particular interested in the situation when $\mathbb {B}$ is a measure algebra as in this case we obtain a natural tool for studying topological convergence properties of sequences of ultrafilters on $\mathbb {A}$ in random extensions of (...) the set-theoretical universe. This appears to have strong connections with Dow and Fremlin’s result stating that there are Efimov spaces in the random model. We also investigate relations between topologies on $\mathcal {H}(\mathbb {A},\mathbb {B})$ for a Boolean algebra $\mathbb {B}$ carrying a strictly positive measure and convergence properties of sequences of measures on $\mathbb {A}$. (shrink)