Abstract

The problem of the theoretical reconstruction of the process of scientific paradigm change is by no means a new one in the philosophy and sociology of science. Nevertheless, one cannot say that its investigation has reached the point at which an overwhelming majority of specialists would agree at least about exactly how and in what directions it is necessary to move forward. Notwithstanding this circumstance, one can specify a certain set of basic questions that are recognized as such by the scholarly community of specialists in the field of the sociology and philosophy of science. This set includes such problems as the interaction of the empirical and the theoretical, of the rational and the irrational, of the individual and the social and, of course, the problem of the interaction of cognitive and social factors in the process of paradigm change. The last problem is a kind of focus, at which various approaches converge in order to engage in harsh criticism of one another. Despite the fact that everyone agreed long ago that the logico-empiricistic model of the development of scientific knowledge is inadequate and one-sided, the approaches proposed during the last ten to fifteen years-especially those belonging to the "strong program of the sociology of science"-are also subject to serious criticism. The observer cannot but form the impression that researchers, disillusioned with the extremes of the logicist approach, have turned to a no less one-sided and extreme sociocultural approach that leads to a boundless relativism that is extremely vulnerable in respect of methodology . In particular, the latter approach relies on the well-known Kuhn-Feyerabend thesis concerning the incommensurability of successive paradigms, which presents in a provocatively irrational light the behavior of specialists in the mathematically most developed and rationally most elaborated fields of scientific knowledge