Act and value: Expectation and the representability of moral theories

Theoria 57 (1-2):42-76 (1991)

Graham Oddie
University of Colorado, Boulder
According to the axiologist the value concepts are basic and the deontic concepts are derivative. This paper addresses two fundamental problems that arise for the axiologist. Firstly, what ought the axiologist o understand by the value of an act? Second, what are the prospects in principle for an axiological representation of moral theories. Can the deontic concepts of any coherent moral theory be represented by an agent-netural axiology: (1) whatever structure those concepts have and (2) whatever the causal structure of the world happens to be. We show that the answer is "almost always". The only substantive constraint is that autonomous moral agents cannot have the power to simultaneously block the options open to other autonomous moral agents. But this seems to be part and parcel of the notion of an autonomous moral agent.
Keywords consequentializing moral theories  generalized axiology  axiological representation of deontic content
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1991.tb00540.x
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Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.

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