Simulating Market Entry Rewards for Antibiotics Development

Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 46 (s1):32-42 (2018)
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Abstract

We design an agent based Monte Carlo model of antibiotics research and development to explore the effects of the policy intervention known as Market Entry Reward on the likelihood that an antibiotic entering pre-clinical development reaches the market. By means of sensitivity analysis we explore the interaction between the MER and four key parameters: projected net revenues, R&D costs, venture capitalists discount rates, and large pharmaceutical organizations' financial thresholds. We show that improving revenues may be more efficient than reducing costs, and thus confirm that this pull-based policy intervention effectively stimulates antibiotics R&D.

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