In defense of the conditional probability solution to the swamping problem

Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):93-114 (2009)
Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Many authors contend, however, that reliabilism is incompatible with this item of common sense. If a belief is true, adding that it was reliably produced doesn't seem to make it more valuable. The value of reliability is swamped by the value of truth. In Goldman and Olsson (2009), two independent solutions to the problem were suggested. According to the conditional probability solution, reliabilist knowledge is more valuable in virtue of being a stronger indicator than mere true belief of future true belief. This article defends this solution against some objections.
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Erik J. Olsson (2011). The Value of Knowledge. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.
Julien Dutant (2013). In Defence of Swamping. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):357-366.

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