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Andreas Stephens
Lund University
  1.  16
    A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How : Grasping Truths in a Practical Way.Cathrine V. Felix & Andreas Stephens - 2020 - Philosophies 5 (1):5-0.
    For quite some time, cognitive science has offered philosophy an opportunity to address central problems with an arsenal of relevant theories and empirical data. However, even among those naturalistically inclined, it has been hard to find a universally accepted way to do so. In this article, we offer a case study of how cognitive-science input can elucidate an epistemological issue that has caused extensive debate. We explore Jason Stanley’s idea of the practical grasp of a propositional truth and present naturalistic (...)
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  2.  8
    A Cognitive Perspective on Knowledge How: Why Intellectualism Is Neuro-Psychologically Implausible.Andreas Stephens & Cathrine V. Felix - 2020 - Philosophies 5 (21):21-0.
    We defend two theses: Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that is based on a consideration of the nature of slips and basic activities. We further argue that Stanley’s brand of intellectualism has certain ontological consequences that go against modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology. We tie up our line of thought by showing that input from cognitive neuroscience and (...)
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  3.  22
    Induction and Knowledge-What.Peter Gärdenfors & Andreas Stephens - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):471-491.
    Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that (...)
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  4.  23
    Induction and Knowledge-What.Peter Gärdenfors & Andreas Stephens - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):1-21.
    Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that (...)
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  5.  45
    A Pluralist Account of Knowledge as a Natural Kind.Andreas Stephens - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):1-19.
    In an attempt to address some long-standing issues of epistemology, Hilary Kornblith proposes that knowledge is a natural kind the identification of which is the unique responsibility of one particular science: cognitive ethology. As Kornblith sees it, the natural kind thus picked out is knowledge as construed by reliabilism. Yet the claim that cognitive ethology has this special role has not convinced all critics. The present article argues that knowledge plays a causal and explanatory role within many of our more (...)
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  6.  3
    A Dynamical Perspective on the Generality Problem.Andreas Stephens, Trond A. Tjøstheim, Maximilian Roszko & Erik J. Olsson - 2021 - Acta Analytica:1-14.
    The generality problem is commonly considered to be a critical difficulty for reliabilism. In this paper, we present a dynamical perspective on the problem in the spirit of naturalized epistemology. According to this outlook, it is worth investigating how token belief-forming processes instantiate specific types in the biological agent’s cognitive architecture and background experience, consisting in the process of attractor-guided neural activation. While our discussion of the generality problem assigns “scientific types” to token processes, it represents a unified account in (...)
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  7.  7
    The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection.Andreas Stephens & Trond Arild Tjöstheim - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection. According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in (...)
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  8. Three Levels of Naturalistic Knowledge.Andreas Stephens - 2019 - In Peter Gärdenfors, Antti Hautamäki, Frank Zenker & Mauri Kaipainen (eds.), Conceptual Spaces: Elaborations and Applications. Springer Verlag.
    A recent naturalistic epistemological account suggests that there are three nested basic forms of knowledge: procedural knowledge-how, conceptual knowledge-what, and propositional knowledge-that. These three knowledge-forms are grounded in cognitive neuroscience and are mapped to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory respectively. This article investigates and integrates the neuroscientifically grounded account with knowledge-accounts from cognitive ethology and cognitive psychology. It is found that procedural and semantic memory, on a neuroscientific level of analysis, matches an ethological reliabilist account. This formation also matches (...)
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  9.  8
    Intelligence as Accurate Prediction.Trond A. Tjøstheim & Andreas Stephens - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    This paper argues that intelligence can be approximated by the ability to produce accurate predictions. It is further argued that general intelligence can be approximated by context dependent predictive abilities combined with the ability to use working memory to abstract away contextual information. The flexibility associated with general intelligence can be understood as the ability to use selective attention to focus on specific aspects of sensory impressions to identify patterns, which can then be used to predict events in novel situations (...)
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  10.  4
    The Cognitive Philosophy of Communication.Trond A. Tjøstheim, Andreas Stephens, Andrey Anikin & Arthur Schwaninger - 2020 - Philosophies 5 (39):39-0.
    Numerous species use different forms of communication in order to successfully interact in their respective environment. This article seeks to elucidate limitations of the classical conduit metaphor by investigating communication from the perspectives of biology and artificial neural networks. First, communication is a biological natural phenomenon, found to be fruitfully grounded in an organism’s embodied structures and memory system, where specific abilities are tied to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory as well as to working memory. Second, the account explicates (...)
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