Abstract
The opening chapter of the Categories fails to reveal whether it is introducing a grammatical, a logical, or a metaphysical treatise. It deals with equivocals and univocals and ends with a definition of paronyms. The definition of paronyms is given in purely grammatical terms. Paronyms derive their name from an identical source with a difference only in case ending, as bravery and the brave, grammar and the grammarian. The second chapter, however, proceeds to state that an expression can be either complex or simple--complex like "a man runs," or simple like "man" or "runs." Then it immediately passes over to beings. Of the things that are, it states, some are asserted of a subject, but are not in any subject. The example given is that "man" is asserted of a particular man. To supply for Aristotle a current instance of what is here meant, one might use the sentence "Bertrand Russell is a man." This type of statement, to take the Aristotelian text literally, is dealing with beings and is asserting something of a subject. What is asserted, "man," is not in any subject even though it is asserted of a subject. In other words, the logically proper name "Bertrand Russell" denotes a substance and not an accident.