Synthese 190 (16):3511-3533 (2013)
AbstractThis paper discusses simultaneous belief updates. I argue here that modeling such belief updates using the Principle of Minimum Information can be regarded as applying Jeffrey conditionalization successively, and so that, contrary to what many probabilists have thought, the simultaneous belief updates can be successfully modeled by means of Jeffrey conditionalization.
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Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
Subjective Probability: The Real Thing.Richard Jeffrey - 2002 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.