Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams’s Thesis

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs039 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I show that David Lewis’s principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis’s reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams’s thesis applies also to his own principal principle. 1 Introduction2 Adams’s Thesis, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and the Principal Principle3 Jeffrey Conditionalization4 The Principal Principles Not Preserved under Jeffrey Conditionalization5 Inadmissible Experiences

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-03-06

Downloads
263 (#80,657)

6 months
38 (#100,987)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ittay Nissan-Rozen
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Citations of this work

Consistent desires and climate change.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):241-255.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.

View all 27 references / Add more references