Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams's Thesis


Authors
Ittay Nissan-Rozen
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
I show that David Lewis’s principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis’s reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams’s thesis applies also to his own principal principle. 1 Introduction2 Adams’s Thesis, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and the Principal Principle3 Jeffrey Conditionalization4 The Principal Principles Not Preserved under Jeffrey Conditionalization5 Inadmissible Experiences
Keywords Jeffrey conditionalization  The principal principle  The desire as belief thesis  Adams thesis
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axs039
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References found in this work BETA

On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431.

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