Why our identity is not what matters

In Raymond Martin & John Barresi (eds.), Personal identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 115--143 (2003)
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Abstract

Presents actual cases of brain bisection; how we might be able to divide and reunite our minds; what explains the unity of consciousness at any time; the imagined case of full division, in which each half of our brain would be successfully transplanted into the empty skull of another body; why neither of the resulting people would be us; why this would not matter, since our relation to each of these people contains what matters in the prudential sense, giving us reasons to care about these people, which are like our reasons to care about our own future;and how it is hard to believe that personal identity, or our own continued existence, is not what matters.

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Derek Parfit
Last affiliation: Oxford University

Citations of this work

Phenomenological approaches to personal identity.Jakub Čapek & Sophie Loidolt - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):217-234.
Personal identity and the otherness of one’s own body.Jakub Čapek - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 52 (3):265-277.
Persoonlijke identiteit en fundamenteel zelfbegrip.Christiane Seidel - 2006 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 2.
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