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Summary For many, the motivation to investigate personal identity is its seemingly tight (and perhaps grounding) connection to many normative concerns.  These include moral responsibility, compensation, prudence, various moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, and pride), abortion, definition of death, advance directives, genetic manipulation, and population ethics.  The relation between identity and these practical concerns is controversial, however, with several theorists questioning whether identity has much, or any, bearing on them at all.
Key works John Locke first explicitly explored the relation between personal identity and moral responsibility (see Perry 1975).  The first major contemporary explorer of these issues was Derek Parfit, in Parfit 1971, Parfit 1973, followed by a more wide-ranging discussion in Part III of Parfit 1984.  Other significant works on various aspects of the topic include Williams 1981, Johnston 1987, Korsgaard 1989, Jeske 1993, Schechtman 1996, Brink 1997, Olson 1997, Conee 1999, McMahan 2002, DeGrazia 2005, and Shoemaker 2007.
Introductions Encyclopedia entry: Shoemaker 2008.  Introductory books: DeGrazia 2005 and Shoemaker 2008.
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  1. Malcolm Acock (1981). Justification and Survival. Philosophical Studies 39 (3):247 - 261.
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  2. K. Andrews (2014). Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare's Two-Level Utilitarianism, by Gary E. Varner * The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Edited by Robert W. Lurz. Mind 123 (491):959-966.
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  3. Gil anidjar (2004). On Cultural Survival. Angelaki 9 (2):5 – 15.
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  4. James Baillie (1997). Personal Identity and Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do not (...)
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  5. D. P. Baker (1999). Taylor and Parfit on Personal Identity: A Response to Lotter [1]. South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):331-346.
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  6. Z. Bauman (1992). Survival as a Social Construct. Theory, Culture and Society 9 (1):1-36.
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  7. S. Beck (1987). In Defence of Self-Interest: A Response to Parfit. South African Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):119-124.
    Derek Parfit argues in Reasons and Persons that acting according to your present desires is more rational, or at least as rational, as acting in your long-term self-interest. To do this, he puts forward a case supporting a 'critical present-aim theory' of rationality opposed to the self-interest theory, and then argues against a number of possible replies. This article is a response to these arguments, concluding that Parfit's favouring of the present-aim theory is unfounded, and that self-interest is the better (...)
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  8. Kathy Behrendt (2005). Impersonal Identity and Corrupting Concepts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188.
    How does the concept of a person affect our beliefs about ourselves and the world? In an intriguing recent addition to his established Reductionist view of personal identity, Derek Parfit speculates that there could be beings who do not possess the concept of a person. Where we talk and think about persons, selves, subjects, or agents, they talk and think about sequences of thoughts and experiences related to a particular brain and body. Nevertheless their knowledge and experience of the world (...)
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  9. Kathy Behrendt (2003). The New Neo-Kantian and Reductionist Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350.
    Has Derek Parfit modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam’s neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit’s recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. I (...)
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  10. Kathy Behrendt (2002). Derek Parfit. In Leemon McHenry, P. Dematteis & P. Fosl (eds.), British Philosophers, 1800-2000. Bruccoli Clark Layman. pp. 262--168.
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  11. Milton Berman (1961). Chapter Seven Struggle for Survival. In John Fiske: The Evolution of a Popularizer. Harvard University Press. pp. 131-156.
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  12. Simon Blackburn (1997). Has Kant Refuted Parfit? In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. pp. 180--201.
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  13. C. P. Blacker (1961). People! Challenge to Survival. The Eugenics Review 53 (2):99.
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  14. Paul Bloomfield (1957). Let's Have a Better World: A Program for Progress and Survival. The Eugenics Review 48 (4):226.
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  15. Bodanszky (1987). Parfit on Selves and Their Interests. Analysis 47:47-50.
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  16. W. R. Bousfield (1923). Human Survival. Hibbert Journal 22:501.
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  17. F. P. Bowden & P. E. Caspar (1963). The Damage of Crystals by Collimated Fission Fragments. Philosophical Magazine 8 (96):2091-2095.
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  18. K. M. Bowkett, L. T. Chadderton, H. Norden & B. Ralph (1967). Fission Fragment Damage in Tungsten. Philosophical Magazine 15 (134):415-421.
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  19. K. M. Bowkett, L. T. Chadderton, H. Norden & B. Ralph (1965). A Study of Fission Fragment Damage in Tungsten with the Field-Ion Microscope. Philosophical Magazine 11 (111):651-656.
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  20. Teresa Brennan (1996). Essence Against Identity. Metaphilosophy 27 (1‐2):92-103.
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  21. Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan (2015). Utility Monsters for the Fission Age. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):392-407.
    One of the standard approaches to the metaphysics of personal identity has some counter-intuitive ethical consequences when combined with maximising consequentialism and a plausible doctrine about aggregation of consequences. This metaphysical doctrine is the so-called ‘multiple occupancy’ approach to puzzles about fission and fusion. It gives rise to a new version of the ‘utility monster’ problem, particularly difficult problems about infinite utility, and a new version of a Parfit-style ‘repugnant conclusion’. While the article focuses on maximising consequentialism for simplicity, the (...)
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  22. Mark T. Brown (1990). Why Individual Identity Matters. Southwest Philosophy Review 6 (1):99-104.
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  23. Stuart M. Brown & Lewis Mumford (1946). Values for Survival. Philosophical Review 55 (4):477.
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  24. Alex Byrne & D. H. Mellor (1993). Matters of Metaphysics. Philosophical Review 102 (2):285.
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  25. F. K. C. (1973). Logic Matters. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):125-126.
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  26. Jack Stanley Call (2001). The Further Fact View of Personal Identity: The Case Against Parfit's Reductionism. Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
    In this dissertation I defend the claim that what matters in survival is continuing to be conscious or recovering consciousness, and its corollary that identity is a necessary condition for what matters in survival. ;Derek Parfit opposes this view, and my defense of it consists in a critical examination of the main types of imaginary cases he uses to argue for his Reductionist View . I argue for the following points: In a spectrum of cases in which varying percentages of (...)
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  27. Daniel Callahan (1985). The Tyranny of Survival and Other Pathologies of Civilized Life. Upa.
    Originally published in 1973 by Macmillan, this probing book examines the uses, control and consequences of technology in a world which must either take realistic stock of its obsession with unbridled progress and individual freedom or perish in its excesses. Co-published with the Center for the Study of Values, University of Delaware.
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  28. Scot Campbell (2001). Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival. Ratio 14 (3):193-202.
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  29. W. R. Carter (1989). Brennan, A., "Conditions of Identity: A Study of Identity and Survival". [REVIEW] Mind 98:315.
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  30. W. R. Carter (1983). Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):248 – 265.
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  31. Helen Morris Cartwright (1993). On Two Arguments for the Indeterminacy of Personal Identity. Synthese 95 (2):241-273.
    Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that (...)
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  32. Quassim Cassam (1993). II—Parfit on Persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1):17-38.
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  33. Quassim Cassam (1989). Kant and Reductionism. Review of Metaphysics 43 (September):72-106.
  34. Furio Cerutti (2015). Humankind's First Fundamental Right: Survival. Constellations 22 (1):59-67.
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  35. James Van Cleve & Andrew Brennan (1992). Conditions of Identity: A Study of Identity and Survival. Philosophical Review 101 (2):411.
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  36. J. Coatman & E. E. Harris (1951). The Survival of Political Man. Philosophical Quarterly 1 (3):287.
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  37. Gerald A. Cohen (1966). Beliefs and R?Les. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:17 - 34.
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  38. Wesley Cooper (2008). Nozick, Parfit, and Platonic Glasses. Sorites 20:98-116.
    The Closest-Continuer schema of identity is distinguished here from the Closest-Continuer theory of personal identity, the latter applying the former to personal identity by reference to the self's self-defining activity. Nozick's «Platonic glasses» mode of conceptualizing personal identity is defended against Parfit's objections and extended beyond hypothetical branching to the actual branching hypothesized by the «no-collapse» theories of quantum mechanics. The reader may wish to consult Lev Vaidman's Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy essay, «Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics», for an accessible (...)
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  39. Kevin J. Corcoran (2001). Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival Without Temporal Gaps. In Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  40. R. M. Cornell (1969). The Growth of Fission Gas Bubbles in Irradiated Uranium Dioxide. Philosophical Magazine 19 (159):539-554.
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  41. Rita D. Costello (forthcoming). Survival Training. Feminist Studies.
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  42. Jonathan Dancy (1997). Parfit and Indirectly Self-Defeating Theories. In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. pp. 1--23.
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  43. Susan Dowell (1985). II?Prolifers for Survival. New Blackfriars 66 (776):67-72.
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  44. Rem B. Edwards (1983). Review of Matters of Faith and Matters of Principle. Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):956-958.
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  45. Douglas Ehring (2013). Why Parfit Did Not Go Far Enough. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):133-149.
    Parfit has argued for the revolutionary thesis that personal identity does not matter in ordinary survival, only the R-relation does. “Reconciliationists,” such as Lewis, have tried to stop this revolution, arguing that both personal identity and the R-relation matter. The disagreement has been between those who hold that only the R-relation matters and those who hold that, in addition, personal identity matters. But there is a third option. I argue that Parfit is right that personal identity does not matter but (...)
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  46. Alice Evans (2007). Why Parfit’s Contradiction Makes Me Think I Don’T Exist. Lyceum 8.
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  47. Christopher Evers (1995). Parfit's Polymerous Persons. Cogito 9 (2):126-130.
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  48. D. Favrholdt (1990). Some Reflections on Parfit's Discussion of Personal Identity. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 25:7-21.
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  49. Andrew Feenberg (1979). Beyond the Politics of Survival. Theory and Society 7 (3):319-361.
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  50. R. Austin Freeman (1940). Culture and Survival. The Eugenics Review 32 (2):59.
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