On the determination argument against deflationism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):243–250 (2007)

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Abstract
(Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2007) > Another look at Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan’s criticism of deflationism. I claim that their argument turns on a simple confusion about definitions and thereby fails to establish that deflationism somehow requires meaning to be explained in terms of truth conditions.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00289.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Seas of Language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.

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Citations of this work BETA

Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.

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