Scepticism against Scepticism

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:205-216 (2008)
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Abstract

To analyze some sсeptical arguments was build the epistemological model about only one perceiving subject “Enarch”: he is one (ἐνᾴϛ) and has beginning (ἀρχῄ) in itself. This model was applyed for critical analysis of Husserl’s and Putnam’s attempts to overcome scepticism (i) by using “the intersubjective program” in a first case and (ii) argument “brains in a vat” in a second one. To justify the equivalence of the “intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness” Husserl suggested the existence of transcendental Community. The main goal of the paper is to show that intersubjective epistemology faces the difficulty: the equivalence of the“intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness” is not feasible. Developing Putnam’s model “brains in a vat” about boundaries of scepticism has been formulated the argument about “back of the head”. It showed that skepticism is much more strictly doctrine than it was suggested by Putnam.

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