Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?

Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207 (2011)
Abstract
Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do so.
Keywords Justification  Normative ethics  Self-effacement  Virtue ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,470
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Aristotle (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Paul Barry (2016). Schizophrenia and the Virtues of Self-Effacement. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (1):29-48.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-10-18

Total downloads

116 ( #38,829 of 1,925,583 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #124,665 of 1,925,583 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.