Popper and nursing theory

Nursing Philosophy 4 (1):4-16 (2003)

Peter Allmark
University of Leeds (PhD)
Science seems to develop by inducing new knowledge from observation. However, it is hard to find a rational justification for induction. Popper offers one attempt to resolve this problem. Nursing theorists have tended to ignore or reject Popper, often on the false belief that he is a logical positivist (and hence hostile to qualitative research). Logical positivism claims that meaningful sentences containing any empirical content should ultimately be reducible to simple, observation statements. Popper refutes positivism by showing that there are no such simple statements. He is not a positivist. For Popper, the scientist begins with problems and puts forward trial solutions. These are subjected to rigorous testing aimed at falsifying them. A new theoretical position is then reached in which the scientist knows either that the trial solutions are false or that they have not yet been falsified. Science is characterized by the fact that it tests its ideas through attempted falsification. Nonscience tests its ideas through attempted refutation. Nursing theory is a mixture of science and non-science. Popper’s method requires rigorous testing of theory in both realms. As such, some nursing theory should be discarded. Popper’s view faces at least two important criticisms. One is that a scientist can always reject an apparent falsification by instead altering some auxiliary hypothesis (e.g. denying the accuracy of the falsifying observation). Popper can deal with this argument by saying that defence of a theory in this way will eventually break down if the theory is false. The second criticism is that Popper’s method does ultimately draw upon induction. This criticism is true, but his method can be usefully adapted. An adapted from of Popper’s philosophy of science provides a good basis for nursing theory.
Keywords philosophy  nursing  Popper  science  theory  logical positivism  qualitative research
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DOI 10.1046/j.1466-769X.2003.00114.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Objective Knowledge.Karl R. Popper - 1972 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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