JAK PRZEKONAĆ KANTA DO KŁAMSTWA? APORIE IMPERATYWU KATEGORYCZNEGO
Abstract
HOW TO PERSUADE KANT TO LIE? THE APORIES OF CATEGORICAL
IMPERATIVE
Some critical interpreters of Kant’s ethics accuse it for not
corresponding to our common moral convictions. Kant claims that we
are not allowed to lie to a murderer at the door even when he wants to
kill his victim being our friend hidden by us. In this paper I argue
against the opinion that there is a sufficient justification for this
restriction in Kant’s ethics. If we reconsider the central point of Kant’s
moral theory, which is categorical imperative, we will find several
arguments for accepting lying in some cases. What is more, in extreme
situations we are obliged to lie, for example when it is the only way to
save the innocent victim’s life. Thus, one can suggest that Kant
interpreted his own theory in a wrong way. In conclusion, I advocate for
the view that, after all, Kant’s theory remains in agreement with the
common moral intuitions.