The philosophical issue in machine consciousness

International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176 (2009)
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Abstract

The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess'. Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness

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Peter Boltuc
University of Illinois at Springfield

Citations of this work

The philosophy of computer science.Raymond Turner - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Qualia and conscious machines.Pentti O. A. Haikonen - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):225-234.
Why think that the brain is not a computer?Marcin Miłkowski - 2016 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 16 (2):22-28.
Enkinaesthesia: the fundamental challenge for machine consciousness.S. A. J. Stuart - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (1):145-162.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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