How to use probabilities in reasoning

Philosophical Studies 64 (1):65 - 85 (1991)
Probabilities are important in belief updating, but probabilistic reasoning does not subsume everything else (as the Bayesian would have it). On the contrary, Bayesian reasoning presupposes knowledge that cannot itself be obtained by Bayesian reasoning, making generic Bayesianism an incoherent theory of belief updating. Instead, it is indefinite probabilities that are of principal importance in belief updating. Knowledge of such indefinite probabilities is obtained by some form of statistical induction, and inferences to non-probabilistic conclusions are carried out in accordance with the statistical syllogism. Such inferences have been the focus of much attention in the nonmonotonic reasoning literature, but the logical complexity of such inference has not been adequately appreciated
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DOI 10.1007/BF00356090
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
The Emergence of Probability.Ian Hacking - 1995 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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