Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?: Implications for Law and Public Policy

Legal Theory 3 (1):23-35 (1997)
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Abstract

Some people hate themselves. But if I say, “I hate myself,” who is this “I” that stands apart from “myself”? And notice how in the expression “I am not myself today,” the “I” and “myself” change places. Now it is “myself” who is the authentic, the authoritative, the judgmental “I,” and it is “I” who is the self that is judged and found wanting. Some people talk to themselves; when they do, who is speaking and who is listening?

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The metaphysics of brain death.Jeff Mcmahan - 1995 - Bioethics 9 (2):91–126.
Viii Persons, Character and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 197-216.

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