Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction

Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (1):9-40 (2006)

Diane Proudfoot
University of Canterbury
The canonical version of possible worlds semantics for story prefixes is due to David Lewis. This paper reassesses Lewis's theory and draws attention to some novel problems for his account
Keywords contradiction  counterfactuals  fiction  impossible worlds  inconsistent narrative  incomplete narrative  Lewis  modal fictionalism  possible worlds  truth in fiction
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-005-9005-8
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.

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Citations of this work BETA

Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision.Francesco Berto & Christopher Badura - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):178-193.
Truth in Fiction.Richard Woodward - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (3):158-167.
Ontic Terms and Metaontology, Or: On What There Actually Is.T. Parent - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):199-214.

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