In Erich Reck (ed.), From Frege to Wittgenstein: Essays on Early Analytic Philosophy, 283–307. Oxford University Press (2002)

Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein criticizes Frege and Russell's view that laws of inference (Schlussgesetze) "justify" logical inferences. What lies behind this criticism, I argue, is an attack on Frege and Russell's conceptions of logical entailment. In passing, I examine Russell's dispute with Bradley on the question whether all relations are "internal".
Keywords inference  laws of inference  Frege  Russell  Wittgenstein  Ricketts  Bradley  internal relation  external relation  Ricketts
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References found in this work BETA

What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
Frege on Knowing the Foundation.Tyler Burge - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):305-347.
Introduction.Robert P. Russell - 1961 - The Saint Augustine Lecture Series:5-6.
Necessity.G. E. Moore - 1900 - Philosophical Review 9:665.

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On the Sense and Reference of a Logical Constant.Harold Hodes - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):134–165.

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