In Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Sara Protasi
University of Puget Sound
I argue that fitting envy plays a special role in safeguarding our happiness and flourishing. After presenting my theory of envy and its fittingness conditions, I contrast Kant’s view that envy is always unfitting with D’Arms and Jacobson’s defense of fitting envy as an evolutionarily-shaped response to a deep and wide human concern, that is, relative positioning. However, D’Arms and Jacobson don’t go far enough. First, I expand on their analysis of positional goodness, distinguishing between an epistemic claim, according to which we use implicit or explicit comparison to know what position we occupy in a continuum of goodness, and thus to form judgments of goodness, and a metaphysical one, according to which much human goodness depends on implicit or explicit rankings and positionality. Second, I argue that fitting envy is not only intrinsically valuable qua fitting response to authentic goodness, but can be epistemically, morally and prudentially valuable.
Keywords Envy  Fitting envy  Positional goods  Fittingness  Value of envy  Envy and flourishing  Emulative envy
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References found in this work BETA

Achievement.Gwen Bradford - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Envy.Sara Protasi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):535-549.
Moral Reality.Paul Bloomfield - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
The Moral Value of Envy.Krista K. Thomason - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53.

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Citations of this work BETA

Value-First Accounts of Reasons and Fit.R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - In Fittingness. Oxford University Press.

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