Results for 'Fittingness'

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  1. Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.
    The normative notion of fittingness figures saliently in the work of a number of ethical theorists writing in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries and has in recent years regained prominence, occupying an important place in the theoretical tool kits of a range of contemporary writers. Yet the notion remains strikingly undertheorized. This article offers a (partial) remedy. I proceed by canvassing a number of attempts to analyze the fittingness relation in other terms, arguing that none is fully (...)
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  2. Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.
    According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to value X. But what is it for an attitude to be fitting? A popular recent view is that it is for there to be sufficient reason for the attitude. In this paper we argue that proponents of the fitting-attitudes account should reject this view and instead take fittingness as basic. In this way they avoid the notorious ‘wrong kind of reason’ (...)
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  3. Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.
    This paper draws on the 'Fitting Attitudes' analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours are (...)
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  4. The Fittingness of Emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.
    We often assess emotions as appropriate or inappropriate depending on certain evaluative aspects of the world. Often using the term ‘fittingness’ as equivalent to ‘appropriateness’, many philosophers of emotion take fittingness assessments of emotions to be a broadly representational matter. On this sort of view, an emotion is fitting or appropriate just in case there is a kind of representational match between the emotion and the object, a matching analogous to truth for belief. This view provides an account (...)
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  5. Fittingness First?: Reasons to Withhold Belief.Wooram Lee - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Recent years have seen the rise of fittingness-first views, which take fittingness to be the most basic normative feature, in terms of which other normative features can be explained. This paper poses a serious difficulty for the fittingness-first approach by showing that existing fittingness-first accounts cannot plausibly accommodate an important class of reasons: reasons not to believe a proposition. There are two kinds of reasons not to believe a proposition: considerations that are counterevidence; and considerations that (...)
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  6. Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
    The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the relation and its relevance to contemporary debates in normative and metanormative philosophy and proceeds to survey issues to do with fittingness covered in the volume’s chapters, including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relations between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. The chapter concludes (...)
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  7.  51
    Fittingness and Good Reasoning.John Brunero - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (2).
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning.
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  8. Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
    Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.
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  9. Fittingness.Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  10. Fittingness and Idealization.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):572-588.
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is (...)
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  11. Fittingness Objections to Consequentialism.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2019 - In Christian Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems? Oxford University Press.
    New work in the foundations of ethics—extending the fitting attitudes analysis of value to yield a broader notion of normative fittingness as a (or perhaps even the) fundamental normative concept—provides us with the resources to clarify and renew the force of traditional character-based objections to consequentialism. According to these revamped fittingness objections, consequentialism is incompatible with plausible claims about which attitudes are truly fitting. If a theory’s implications regarding the fittingness facts are implausible, then this can be (...)
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  12.  39
    Content and the Fittingness of Emotion.Brian Scott Ballard - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa074.
    Many philosophers of emotion, whether perceptual or cognitive theorists, have claimed that emotions represent evaluative properties. This is often supported by an appeal to the fittingness of emotion: that emotions can be fitting shows they represent evaluative properties. In this paper, however, I argue that this inference is much too fast. In fact, no aspect of the rational assessment of emotion directly supports the claim that emotions represent evaluative properties. This inference can, however, be matured into an inference to (...)
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  13. Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
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  14.  46
    Guilt, Desert, Fittingness, and the Good.Coleen Macnamara - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (4):449-468.
    Desert-realists maintain that those who do wrong without an excuse deserve blame. Desert-skeptics deny this, holding that though we may be responsible for our actions in some sense, we lack the kind of responsibility needed to deserve blame. In two recent papers, Randolph Clarke advances an innovative defense of desert-realism. He argues for deserved-guilt, the thesis that the guilty deserve to feel guilt. In his 2013 paper, Clarke suggests two strategies for defending deserved-guilt: the fitting-guilt strategy and the good-guilt strategy. (...)
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  15.  78
    Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of Our Attitudes.Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    We direct different attitudes towards states of affairs depending on where in time those states of affairs are located. Call this the type asymmetry. The type asymmetry appears fitting. For instance, it seems fitting to feel guilt or regret only about states of affairs that are past, and anticipation only of states of affairs that are future. It has been argued that the type asymmetry could only be fitting if there are tensed facts, and hence that since it is fitting, (...)
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  16. Globalist Attitudes and the Fittingness Objection.Macalester Bell - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):449-472.
    Some attitudes typically take whole persons as their objects. Shame, contempt, disgust and admiration have this feature, as do many tokens of love and hate. Objectors complain that these ‘globalist attitudes’ can never fit their targets and thus can never be all-things-considered appropriate. Those who dismiss all globalist attitudes in this way are misguided. The fittingness objection depends on an inaccurate view of the person-assessments at the heart of the globalist attitudes. Once we understand the nature of globalist attitudes (...)
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  17. Being implicated: on the fittingness of guilt and indignation over outcomes.Gunnar Björnsson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):1–18.
    When is it fitting for an agent to feel guilt over an outcome, and for others to be morally indignant with her over it? A popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was a cause of the outcome. This paper reviews some of what makes this causal-explanatory view attractive before turning to two kinds of problem cases: cases of collective harms and cases of fungible switching. These, it is argued, motivate a related (...)
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  18.  22
    Sensed Fittingness Between Act and Consequence: The Last Acts of Esther in the Book of Esther and Grace in the Film Dogville.Gerrie Snyman - 2013 - Hts Theological Studies 69 (1):1-9.
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  19.  21
    Justice as Fittingness.Geoffrey Cupit - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a new approach to a fundamental question: What is justice? In building his theory, Cupit maintains that injustice should be understood as a form of unfitting treatment--typically the treatment of people as less than they are. Justice is therefore closely related to unjustified contempt and disrespect, and ultimately to desert.
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  20. Fittingness and Divine Action in Cur Deus Homo.Thomas P. Flint - 2009 - In Kevin Timpe & Eleonore Stump (eds.), Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump. Routledge.
     
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  21. Justice as Fittingness.Geoffrey Cupit - 1998 - Law and Philosophy 17 (1):61-75.
     
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  22.  42
    The Fittingness Theory of Truth.David B. Resnik - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (1):95 - 101.
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  23. Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Value, and Reasons.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book has two main aims. First, it develops and defends a constitutive account of normative reasons as premises of good reasoning. This account says, roughly, that to be a normative reason for a response (such as a belief or intention) is to be premise of good reasoning, from fitting responses, to that response. Second, building on the account of reasons, it develops and defends a fittingness-first account of the structure of the normative domain. This account says that there (...)
     
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  24.  5
    The Fittingness and Harmony of Scripture: Toward an Irenaean Hermeneutic.Dustin G. Resch - 2009 - Heythrop Journal 50 (1):74-84.
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  25. Cupitt, G.-Justice as Fittingness.G. Wallace - 1998 - Philosophical Books 39:212-213.
     
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  26.  34
    Geoffrey Cupit: Justice as Fittingness[REVIEW]Roger Panden - 1999 - Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2):263-266.
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  27.  78
    Intuitions of Fittingness.A. W. Price - 2009 - Common Knowledge 15 (3):348-364.
    In one sense of the term current among analytical philosophers, the quietist_lacks skeptical doubts about the metaphysical or epistemological status of ethical judgments as a class of judgment. He may still have doubts about, say, the current state of morality. There are criteria of courage by which, though they are open-ended, a man may count as acting bravely. It need not follow that he has adopted the best tactics. Yet he must have responded fittingly to danger. But how is that (...)
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  28.  7
    A Study of "Fittingness" of Signs to Words by Means of the Semantic Differential.Gordon A. McMurray - 1958 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 56 (4):310.
  29.  72
    On the 'Fittingness' of the Virgin Birth.Oliver D. Crisp - 2008 - Heythrop Journal 49 (2):197–221.
    In modern theology the doctrine of the Virgin Birth of Christ, including the doctrine of his Virginal Conception, has been the subject of considerable scepticism. One line of criticism has been that the traditional doctrine of the Virgin Birth seems unnecessary to the Incarnation. In this essay I lay out one construal of the traditional argument for the doctrine and show that, although one can offer an account of the Incarnation without the Virgin Birth which, in other respects, is perfectly (...)
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  30.  10
    On the Fittingness of Agential Evaluations.Roberto Keller - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):251-268.
    According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and counter...
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  31.  50
    Justice as Fittingness[REVIEW]Owen McLeod - 1998 - Law and Philosophy 17 (1):61-75.
  32. Against the 'First' Views (Formerly Not Fittingness, Not Reasons, Not Value) [Chapter 5 of The True and the Good: A New Theory of Theoretical Reason].Andrew Reisner - manuscript
    This is chapter 5 of the book project _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, in which I explore the claim that both alethic and pragmatic reasons for belief are basic, but that they share a pragmatic foundation in a pluralist theory of wellbeing in which being in a positive epistemic state is a non-derivative component of wellbeing. This chapter argues that all three of fittingness first, reasons first, and value first views are false. It (...)
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  33. On the Fittingness of Agential Evaluations.Roberto Keller - forthcoming - Tandf: Philosophical Explorations:1-18.
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  34.  24
    Justice as Fittingness.Thomas J. Regan - 1998 - International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (3):332-333.
  35.  9
    Can It Be or Feel Right to Hate? On the Appropriateness and Fittingness of Hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2021 - Filozofija I Društvo 32 (3):341-368.
    What exactly is wrong with hating others? However deep-seated the intuition, when it comes to spelling out the reasons for why hatred is inappropriate, the literature is rather meager and confusing. In this paper, I attempt to be more precise by distinguishing two senses in which hatred is inappropriate, a moral and a non-moral one. First, I critically discuss the central current proposals defending the possibility of morally appropriate hatred in the face of serious wrongs or evil perpetrators and show (...)
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  36.  50
    Kriegel on Brentano on Value and Fittingness.Jonas Olson - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  37.  8
    Fulfillment as Human in the Beatific Vision? Problems of Fittingness and Gratuity.P. F. Ryan - 2001 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 46 (1):153-163.
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  38. The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View.Oded Na'aman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):245-269.
    The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...)
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  39.  72
    Value-First Accounts of Reasons and Fit.R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - In Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
    It is tempting to think that all of normativity, such as our reasons for action, what we ought to do, and the attitudes that it is fitting for us to have, derives from what is valuable. But value-first approaches to normativity have fallen out of favour as the virtues of reasons- and fittingness-first approaches to normativity have become clear. On these views, value is not explanatorily prior to reasons and fit; rather the value of things is understood in terms (...)
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  40. Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods.Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):687-698.
    In this paper I argue that Bykvist’s recent challenges to the fitting-attitude account of value (FA) can be successfully met. The challenge from solitary goods claims that FA cannot account for the value of states of affairs which necessarily rule out the presence of favouring subjects. I point out the modal reasons why FA can account for solitary goods by appealing to contemplative attitudes. Bykvist’s second challenge, the ‘distance problem’, questions the ability of FA to match facts about the intensity (...)
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  41. Fitting Anxiety and Prudent Anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.
    Most agree that, in some special scenarios, prudence can speak against feeling a fitting emotion. Some go further, arguing that the tension between fittingness and prudence afflicts some emotions in a fairly general way. This paper goes even further: it argues that, when it comes to anxiety, the tension between fittingness and prudence is nearly inescapable. On any plausible theory, an enormous array of possible outcomes are both bad and epistemically uncertain in the right way to ground fitting (...)
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  42. The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on (...)
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  43.  92
    Gratitude Is Only Fittingly Targeted Towards Agents.Marcus William Hunt - 2021 - Sophia (2):1-19.
    The paper argues that ‘All varieties of gratitude are only overall fitting when targeted towards agents,’ for instance that any variety of gratitude for the beautiful sunset is only overall fitting if a supernatural agent such as God exists. The first premise is that ‘Prepositional gratitude is overall fitting only when targeted towards agents.’ For this premise, intuitive judgments are offered. The second premise is that ‘Prepositional gratitude is the paradigmatic variety of gratitude.’ For this premise, an aspect of the (...)
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  44. Virtue and Emotional Accuracy.Vida Yao -
    It is now common for moral philosophers to be wary of conflating two distinct forms of emotional assessment: the “fittingness” of an emotion, with any form of moral assessment of that emotion. The philosophers who warned against this conflation, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, also warned philosophers not to infer from claims that an emotion is a morally inappropriate emotion to feel, to claims that the emotion is inaccurate, or “unfitting”. Such an inference, they argue, is an instance of (...)
     
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  45.  75
    The Things We Envy: Fitting Envy and Human Goodness.Sara Protasi - forthcoming - In Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that fitting envy plays a special role in safeguarding our happiness and flourishing. After presenting my theory of envy and its fittingness conditions, I contrast Kant’s view that envy is always unfitting with D’Arms and Jacobson’s defense of fitting envy as an evolutionarily-shaped response to a deep and wide human concern, that is, relative positioning. However, D’Arms and Jacobson don’t go far enough. First, I expand on their analysis of positional goodness, distinguishing between an epistemic claim, according (...)
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  46.  14
    Moral Distress in Health Care: When is It Fitting?Lisa Tessman - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (2):165-177.
    Nurses and other medical practitioners often experience moral distress: they feel an anguished sense of responsibility for what they take to be their own moral failures, even when those failures were unavoidable. However, in such cases other people do not tend to think it is right to hold them responsible. This is an interesting mismatch of reactions. It might seem that the mismatch should be remedied by assuring the practitioner that they are not responsible, but I argue that this denies (...)
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  47. Favoring.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1953-1971.
    It has become common to take reasons to form a basic normative category that is not amenable to non-circular analysis. This paper offers a novel characterization of reasons in terms of how we ought or it would be good for us to think in response to our awareness of facts, and thus rejects such Reason Primitivism. Briefly, for r to be a normative reason for A to φ is for it to be the case that A ought to conduct her (...)
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  48.  44
    Admiration Over Time.Alfred Archer & Benjamin Matheson - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):669-689.
    In this paper, we investigate the diachronic fittingness conditions of admiration – that is, what it takes for a person to continue or cease to be admirable over time. We present a series of cases that elicit judgements that suggest different understandings of admiration over time. In some cases, admirability seems to last forever. In other cases, it seems that it can cease within a person’s lifetime if she changes sufficiently. Taken together, these cases highlight what we call the (...)
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  49.  55
    Reason to Feel Guilty.Randolph Clarke & Piers Rawling - 2022 - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 217-36.
    Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, S, is blameworthy for performing an act of A-ing. We advance a slightly qualified version of the following thesis: -/- (Reason) F is (at some time) a reason for S to feel guilty (to some extent) for A-ing. -/- Leaving implicit the qualification concerning extent, we claim as well: -/- (Desert) S's having this reason suffices for S’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing. -/- We also advance a third (...)
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  50. Emotion, Wahrnehmung, evaluative Erkenntnis.Jean Moritz Müller - 2011 - In Achim Stephan, Jan Slaby, Henrik Walter & Sven Walter (eds.), Affektive Intentionalität: Beiträge zur welterschließenden Funktion der menschlichen Gefühle. Paderborn, Deutschland: pp. 110-127.
    This paper explores a currently popular view in the philosophy of emotion, according to which emotions constitute a specific form of evaluative aspect-perception (cf. esp. Roberts 2003, Döring 2004, Slaby 2008). On this view, adequate or fitting emotions play an important epistemic roe vis à vis evaluative knowledge. The paper specifically asks how to conceive of the adequacy or fittingness conditions of emotion. Considering the specific, relational nature of the evaluative properties disclosed by emotions, it is argued that a (...)
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