Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):183 - 195 (2012)

Authors
Katinka Quintelier
University of Ghent
Abstract
There is a widespread conviction that people distinguish two kinds of acts: on the one hand, acts that are generalisably wrong because they go against universal principles of harm, justice, or rights; on the other hand, acts that are variably right or wrong depending on the social context. In this paper we criticise existing methods that measure generalisability. We report new findings indicating that a modification of generalisability measures is in order. We discuss our findings in light of recent criticisms of moral/conventional research
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DOI 10.1080/13546783.2012.669738
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References found in this work BETA

The Morality of Harm.Paulo Sousa, Colin Holbrook & Jared Piazza - 2009 - Cognition 113 (1):80-92.

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Citations of this work BETA

Kinds of Norms.Elizabeth O'Neill - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12416.
Confounds in Moral/Conventional Studies.K. J. P. Quintelier & D. M. T. Fessler - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):58-67.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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