Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):47-48 (2004)
I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover's two types of representations is supported by studies on “object-centered” attention. Furthermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process.
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Defending Realism on the Proper Ground.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
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