Inanimation: A network of feeling and perception

Analysis 80 (2):301-309 (2020)
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Abstract

We often use terms primarily concerned with the description of inanimate objects in order to characterize psychological states or dispositions, without being able to specify the connection between the two uses. I call this inanimation. In this paper, I propose an account of inanimation and of its connection to expressiveness.

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Matteo Ravasio
Peking University

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References found in this work

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
Self-Expression.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Blue and Brown Books.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1958 - Philosophy 34 (131):367-368.
Aesthetic Concepts.Frank Sibley - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (4):421-450.

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