On Specifying Truth-Conditions

Philosophical Review 117 (3):385-443 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This essay is a study of ontological commitment, focused on the special case of arithmetical discourse. It tries to get clear about what would be involved in a defense of the claim that arithmetical assertions are ontologically innocent and about why ontological innocence matters. The essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in order for the truth-conditions thereby specified to be satisfied, on the other. This allows one to set forth an assignment of truth-conditions to arithmetical sentences whereby nothing is required of the world in order for the truth-conditions of a truth of pure arithmetic to be satisfied. The essay then argues that such an assignment can be used to account for the a priori knowability of certain arithmetical truths.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Outscoping and Discourse Threat.Theodore Sider - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):413-426.
Frege’s Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
Tensed Meaning: A Tenseless Account.Heather Dyke - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:65-81.
Truth-Conditions and Contradiction.Douglas Odegard - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):363 - 372.
Game theoretical semantics and entailment.D. E. Over - 1981 - Studia Logica 40 (1):67 - 74.
The Argument from Ignorance against Truth-Conditional Semantics.Paul Saka - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):157 - 169.
Brouwer's Conception of Truth.Casper Storm Hansen - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):379-400.
Subject, Tense and Truth.Pierre Pica - 1986 - In Jacqueline Guéron, Hans-Georg Obenauer & Jean-Yves Pollock (eds.), Grammatical Representations. Foris.
Emotivism and truth conditions.Daniel Stoljar - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):81 - 101.
Revising the logic of logical revision.J. Salerno - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (2):211-227.
Meaning and truth-conditions: A reply to Kemp.Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
212 (#90,509)

6 months
29 (#102,111)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Agustin Rayo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.
Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Øystein Linnebo - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ontological Innocence.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - In A. J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89.
Platonism in Metaphysics.Markn D. Balaguer - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (1):1.
Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Semantics in generative grammar.Irene Heim & Angelika Kratzer - 1998 - Malden, MA: Blackwell. Edited by Angelika Kratzer.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.

View all 67 references / Add more references