Michael Rea
University of Notre Dame
In "Persons and Bodies," Lynne Baker defends what she calls the "Constitution View" of human persons, according to which (a) human persons are constituted by their bodies, and (b) constitution is an asymmetric, nontransitive relation that is somehow "intermediate between identity and separate existence". (Baker 2000: 29) Thesis (a), or something like it, is precisely what we would expect from someone who believes that persons and bodies both are material objects. But thesis (b) is distinctive. Materialists who treat constitution as identity arrive at the view that human persons are identical with their bodies, their brains, or some other material object in the vicinity of their heads. At the other extreme, materialists who treat constitution as nothing more than complete overlap without identity arrive at a simple coincidence theory of the relation between persons and bodies (or brains, or whatever). Baker's view is supposed to stake out a novel account of the nature of constitution.
Keywords Material Constitution
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00164.x
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References found in this work BETA

Material Constitution: A Reader.Michael Rea (ed.) - 1997 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):144-165.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Constitution Question.Ryan Wasserman - 2004 - Noûs 38 (4):693 - 710.
The Constitution Relation and Baker’s Account of It.Marta Campdelacreu - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):1-19.

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