Surviving resurrection


Abstract
In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-009-9222-0
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Personal Identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.

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Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.

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