Domains of discourse

Linguistics and Philosophy 19 (5):445 - 475 (1996)
Abstract
In the first part of this paper I present a defence of the Austinian semantic approach to incomplete quantifiers and similar phenomena (section 2-4). It is part of my defence of Austinian semantics that it incorporates a cognitive dimension (section 4). This cognitive dimension makes it possible to connect Austinian semantics to various cognitive theories of discourse interpretation. In the second part of the paper (sections 5-7), I establish connections between Austinian semantics and four particular theories: • the theory of reference and modes of presentation in terms of information files (see e.g. Perry 1993), • the theory of discourse interpretation as involving a process of context selection (see Sperber and Wilson 1986), • the theory of informational structure (for a survey, see Lambrecht 1994), • the theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985)
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DOI 10.1007/BF00632777
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References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

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Citations of this work BETA
Unrestricted Quantification.Salvatore Florio - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):441-454.
The Argument From Binding.Paul Elbourne - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):89-110.

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